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ABSTRACT 
Then and Now: Comparing Juveniles’ Comprehension of the Miranda Warning in  
the 1970s and Today. 
Christina L. Riggs Romaine 





 In addition to use in research, Grisso’s Instruments for Assessing Understanding 
and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (1998) have been used to help evaluate the validity 
of Miranda waivers in court proceedings and are commonly cited in testimony.  Despite 
their extensive use, the admissibility of the instruments has been questioned in some 
cases because of the outdated vocabulary used and the assumption that Miranda 
comprehension has improved since the 1970s.  To examine this assumption, the results of 
Grisso’s 1970s study were compared to data gathered from 183 21st century juvenile 
offenders.  Twenty-first century youth were tested using the Miranda Rights 
Comprehension Instruments-II.  Results indicated that scores on the two measures were 
comparable, and that juveniles today do not have better understanding of their rights than 
their counterparts in the 1970s.  In fact, on some measures of understanding they showed 
significantly worse understanding.  Verbal IQ continued to be the strongest predictor of 
Miranda rights comprehension in the 21st century.  As in 1970s study, no relationship 
between Miranda comprehension and previous experience with the police was observed. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SUMMARY 
1.1 The Miranda Warning 
1.1.1 Evolution of the Miranda Warning 
 
 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ensures that a citizen will never, 
“be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  Four appeals 
questioning how this right applied to police interrogations were addressed simultaneously 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) (Oberlander & Goldstein, 
2001). In each of these cases, as in 50% of criminal cases (Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993), 
the defendant’s confession was a central piece of evidence.  The appeals questioned the 
circumstances under which these confessions were obtained.  Were the defendants aware 
of their rights, including the rights to silence and to counsel?  If not, could their 
confessions be used against them in court?  As noted by Chief Justice Warren, these cases 
raised important questions about “the restraints society must observe consistent with the 
federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crimes” (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 
p.1609).   
The Court had previously noted the questionable trustworthiness of coerced 
confessions and ruled that a “totality of circumstances” test must be used to evaluate the 
defendant’s waiver of his or her right against self-incrimination (Dickerson v. U.S., 
2000).  This test examines the voluntariness of a confession, including relevant 
information about the defendant’s age, intelligence, criminal history, and the situation in 
which the confession is obtained (Coyote v. U.S., 1967; Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938).  In 
Malloy v. Hogan (1964) the Court ruled that this test is rooted in citizen’s Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and, therefore, applies to states.  A confession is 
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admissible if it is given knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily  by the defendant.  In 
addition, the Court had previously ruled that confessions could not be coerced with 
“brutality and violence”  (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936). Shortly before the Miranda case 
came before the Court, it was decided that the police cannot deny a defendant the right to 
speak with an attorney and that the meeting cannot be delayed in an attempt to obtain a 
confession (Escabedo v. Illinois, 1964).   
In its Miranda decision, the Court upheld and extended the principles of the 
“totality of circumstances” and other prior cases by ruling that a suspect in police custody 
must be explicitly notified of his or her rights if a confession is to be admissible as 
evidence.  Specifically, the warning must include reminders that (a) the suspect has the 
right to remain silent, (b) statements made can be used against the suspect in court, (c) the 
suspect has the right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during 
questioning, and (d) the suspect has the right to a court-appointed attorney if the suspect 
cannot afford one (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  These warnings have become known as 
the Miranda warnings and are often referred to as a suspect’s Miranda rights.   
The dissenters in the five to four Miranda ruling expressed concern that guilty 
individuals would be freed, confessions would be increasingly inadmissible, and 
conviction rates would drop (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  Nonetheless, the majority 
opinion prevailed.  In his assenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren noted that, “Unless 
adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his 
free choice”  (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p.1619).  The debate over the effects of 
Miranda on confessions continues.  There is little empirical evidence comparing 
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confession rates before and after the 1966 ruling, and scholars continue to debate the 
long- and short-term effects of the decision (Cassell, 1996).   
The Miranda ruling stipulates that a defendant’s waiver of his or her rights must 
be knowing , intelligent , and voluntary  (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  Factors used to 
determine the validity of a waiver are listed in Coyote v. U.S. (1967) and include “the 
age, background, and intelligence” of the defendant (p.308).  Although judges tend to use 
similar criteria across cases (Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001), there is no list of mandatory 
criteria that must be considered.  In addition, cutoff scores for measures that might be 
used to evaluate specific criteria have not been established by case law (Grisso, 1986).  
Other factors often considered by the courts include experience with the legal system, 
presence of mental illness, language ability, and level of education (Frumkin, 2000; 
Grisso, 1998; Oberlander, 1998).  Courts may also consider the method of Miranda 
warning delivery; the number of times the warning was given; the method used by the 
police to assess the defendant’s understanding of the warning; and the physical setting of 
questioning, including who was present and what interrogation tactics were used (Grisso, 
1986; Oberlander 1998).     
 The Miranda ruling has been further defined in subsequent Supreme Court 
rulings.  For instance, in 1986, the Court ruled, in Colorado v. Connelly, that a waiver of 
Miranda rights is valid and voluntary as long as it is not given in response to police 
coercion in such a way that police conduct caused the confession (Melton, Petrila, 
Pythress & Slobogin, 1997).   Police coercion has generally been interpreted by the courts 
to mean physical coercion (Oberlander, 1998).    Some cases have recognized the role of 
psychological coercion (e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 1960) but others have found 
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confessions admissible despite evidence of police pressure and persuasion (Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 1980).  Likewise, tactics such as, suggesting that a confession will make things 
go better for the suspect, exaggerating the evidence against a suspect, and informing the 
suspect that a co-suspect has confessed, have all been allowed by lower courts (Miller v. 
State, 1986; Miller v. Fenton, 1986; U.S. v. Velasquez, 1989; State v. Braun, 1973) .   
 In 1968 Congress attempted to return to pre-Miranda methods by passing law 18 
U.S.C. 3501 that required the judge to determine the validity of a waiver on a case-by-
case basis. Judges were to evaluate the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the 
confession, including whether the defendant knew he or she was a suspect and that 
anything said could be used in court.  This test preserved some elements of the Miranda 
warning, but 18 U.S.C. 3501 eliminated the requirement that the warning be delivered to 
the defendant in order for a confession to be admissible.  This law contradicted the 
Miranda ruling and could only be upheld if the Court overturned Miranda.  The 10th 
Circuit court ruled, in 1975, that 3501 determined the admissibility of a confession in the 
federal court system (U.S. v. Crocker).  This ruling and 3501 itself were largely ignored 
until 2000, when they were used as a challenge to Miranda in Dickerson v. U.S. (2000) 
(Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001). 
 In Dickerson, referring in part to stare decisis (to let stand that which was 
decided), the Court upheld Miranda in a seven to two ruling, stating that Congress could 
neither negate Miranda with further laws, nor pass laws contrary to any Supreme Court 
ruling.  Only one majority opinion was given, a rare showing of unanimity by the Court, 
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had long criticized Miranda’s lack of a 
constitutional basis, stated, “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may 
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not be in effect overruled by an act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda 
ourselves” (p.1). 
 Despite the clear 2000 upholding of Miranda, opinions on the application of 
Miranda continue to be varied and complicated.  In 2003, the Court ruled that an 
individual’s rights are not violated by police asking questions without administering the 
Miranda warning, if formal charges are never pressed against the individual (Chavez v. 
Martinez, 2003).  They also ruled that physical evidence can not be suppressed solely 
because it is acquired based on voluntary statements given before the Miranda warning is 
administered (U.S. v. Patane, 2003).   
Evolving police tactics have also raised questions about the timing and necessity 
of the Miranda warning.  In 1985, the Court ruled that statements given after the Miranda 
warning is received and waived are admissible, even if police asked the same questions 
before giving the Miranda warning (Oregon v. Elstad, 1985).  In 2004 the Court qualified 
this opinion, ruling that if the police deliberately use the pre- and post-Miranda 
questioning technique (i.e., suspects are first questioned, then given the Miranda 
warning, and then questioned again until the pre-warning answers are obtained again), the 
break between questioning sessions must be sufficient to let the person understand his or 
her rights and know that he or she does not have to talk to the police (Missouri v. Seibert, 
2004).  In the case of Seibert, the Court found that the break between questioning 
sessions had not been sufficient and deemed the confession given during the second 
questioning session inadmissible.  Although issues surrounding Miranda continue to be 
debated by both critics and proponents, its place in U.S. culture and law was firmly 
established in Dickerson v. U.S. (2000).   
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1.1.2 Miranda in Practice 
 Although the content of the warning was decided in Miranda and affirmed by 
Dickerson, the wording of the actual warning varies across jurisdictions (Goldstein, 
Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman, & Geier, 2003).  Some jurisdictions employ non-English 
versions for suspects whose native languages are not English, and jurisdictions vary in 
the complexity of the wording (Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001).  Since the 1960s, when 
the first warnings were established by jurisdictions, many have simplified the wording of 
the warnings they use.  For example, “lawyer” is often used rather than “attorney”, “talk” 
is frequently used in place of “consult,” and “questioning” is often used instead of 
“interrogation” (Oberlander, 1998).  An example of a typical warning from the 1970s can 
be seen in the Grisso (1981) instruments used to evaluate comprehension of Miranda 
rights: 
1. You do not have to make a statement and have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be held against you in a court of law. 
3. You are entitled to consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have an 
attorney present at the time of the interrogation. 
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you. 
Since that time, most jurisdictions have added a fifth prong to the warning, informing 
suspects that even if they choose to answer police questions, they may stop at any time 
and request a lawyer (Oberlander, 1998).  A typical modern Miranda warning in 
Massachusetts reads:  
1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can be used against you in court. 
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3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and to 
have him or her with you during questioning. 
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning. 
5. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still 
have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer (Oberlander 
& Goldstein, 2001). 
At present, no research has examined if and how the addition of the fifth prong has 
impacted Miranda comprehension.   
 Police use a variety of methods to deliver the Miranda warning.  Such methods 
include slowly and carefully delivering the warning verbally, repeating the warning 
quickly in a rote fashion, giving both a verbal and written warning, giving a written 
warning without any verbal warning, asking the suspect to read the warning (either aloud 
or silently), and asking the suspect to paraphrase the warning (Grisso, 1998).  
Documentation of the delivery of the Miranda warning also varies.  Some police 
departments keep detailed records about the delivery of the warning and suspects’ 
comprehension, including videotaping the warning’s administration.  Others keep hardly 
any record of the waiver of rights (Oberlander, 1998).  Police are not required to assess 
the suspect’s comprehension of the Miranda warning, but many departments use 
procedures ranging from seeking a yes or no answer about understanding to asking the 
suspect to paraphrase each element of the warning to verify the suspect’s comprehension 
(Grisso, 1998). 
 In some jurisdictions the warning is repeated at designated points in police 
officers’ interactions with suspects (e.g., at the time of arrest, when processed at the 
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police station, before questioning begins) (Grisso, 1981, 1998).  The amount of attention 
paid to the warning’s administration can vary greatly (Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001).  
Courts have evaluated, on a case by case basis, the importance and relevance of officers’ 
attention to Miranda..  In Colombe v. Connecticut ( 1961) the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that there is no absolute standard for deciding whether a confession is coerced.    
In order for a confession to be considered coerced, it must result from police misconduct, 
such as the use of physical force, the deprivation of basic necessities (e.g., food, sleep), 
threats of harm, or promises of leniency (see also Kassin, 1997).  Following in this 
tradition, lower courts have upheld the validity of a waiver, despite the police officer’s 
hasty reading of the warning, because the suspect had an extensive arrest history and was 
familiar with arrest procedures (State v. Prater, 1970).   
Popular police training manuals (e.g., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions; 
Inbau, Reid, Buckley & Jane, 2004) offer instruction on how to obtain confessions and 
include specific interrogation strategies, such as implied threats, promises, and incentives.  
Many cases have come before the courts questioning to what extent these strategies are 
permissible.  As discussed previously, the U.S. Supreme Court has found confessions 
admissible despite police pressure and persuasion.  Tactics allowed include pressuring the 
suspect to confess so that others are not harmed, leading the suspect to believe a different 
crime will be discussed, and posing as a fellow inmate in order to obtain a confession 
(Rhode Island v. Innis, 1980; Colorado v. Spring, 1987; Illinois v. Perkins, 1990).  
Similarly, lower courts have found it permissible for the officers to suggest to the 
suspects that telling the truth would be to his or her benefit.  However, any explicit 
statements that telling the truth would aid in the suspect’s defense or cause his or her 
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sentence to be reduced were prohibited.  The confession in State v. Jackson (1983) was 
ruled admissible even though the police misled the defendant into thinking there was 
physical evidence of his presence at the scene of the crime.  In People v. Higgins (1993), 
however, the confession was ruled inadmissible because the police directly lied to the 
defendant about physical evidence at the scene of the crime.   
 The Miranda warning is not required every time police question an individual.  It 
is only necessary to give the warning if the suspect is being questioned in police custody 
with the intent purpose of obtaining a confession (Grisso, 1998).  Police often ask 
questions in the street, at the suspect’s home, or on the way to the police station.  A 
confession may be obtained in each of these cases, but such situations do not necessarily 
require formal Miranda warnings.  If a suspect spontaneously confesses before entering 
police custody, the confession may be admissible if the court finds that the confession 
was in no way elicited by the police (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986).  A confession given 
by a suspect voluntarily in police custody may also be admissible without a formal 
waiver of the suspect’s rights (Oberlander, 1998).     
 The courts have evaluated the need for a reading of the Miranda warning using 
the reasonable person standard.  Because a reading of the warning is required if the 
person is questioned in police custody, this standard evaluates whether a reasonable 
person would know he/she was in police custody in the given circumstances.  Factors 
relevant to the reasonable person standard were described in U.S. v. Streifel  (1986) and 
include the location of questioning (a neutral setting or the police station), the restrictions 
placed on the suspect, the number of police officers present, the length of questioning, 
and whether the suspect was free to end the interview and leave.  Other factors come 
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from case law and include the time spent in a holding cell, the condition of the cell, and 
any police behavior that might be an attempt to instill fear in the suspect (State v. White, 
1973; West v. U.S., 1968). 
1.2 The Juvenile Court 
 Most juvenile courts were formed between 1899 and 1925 (Grisso, 1981).  The 
decision to form a separate court system for juveniles was the result of a number of 
changing ideas in Western society.  Previously, people of all ages had been viewed as 
more less the same, and children over the age of seven were thought to know the 
difference between right and wrong.  In the late 19th and early 20th century, childhood 
came to be viewed as a developmental process in which the person slowly becomes more 
like an adult and is prepared for adulthood (Aries, 1962).  G. Stanley Hall’s work 
formalized this view in the late 19th century and separated adolescence from childhood as 
a unique developmental period (Ross, 1974).   
 Society’s response to the deviant behavior of children also changed during that 
time period.  Previously, Puritan beliefs had dominated society, viewing deviant behavior 
as the result of a child’s sinful nature.  From that viewpoint, the appropriate responses to 
such behavior were harsh punishment and strict moral education.  Around the time the 
juvenile courts were formed, these ideas were replaced by a “deterministic positivism” 
view of crime in which the child’s actions were seen as a consequence of his or her 
inadequate environment (e.g., poverty, poor child-rearing, other social problems).  This 
new way of understanding criminal actions led to different responses to deviant behavior.  
Rehabilitation and social reform efforts were natural outgrowths of this new 
understanding of deviance at both the adult and juvenile levels (Grisso, 1981). 
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 The third modern idea to influence the development of the juvenile courts was 
borrowed from medieval English law.  Parens patriae was originally a concept that 
allowed the feudal landowner to intervene in the raising of a child if the parents were 
somehow threatening the economic value of that child by not raising him or her properly.  
In the 19th century, the courts used this idea as justification for separating parents and 
children, if it was in the best interests of the child and the state.  Children were placed in 
institutions and reformatories that were created under the new, “humanitarian” ideas 
(Grisso, 1981).   
 This view of the child as an individual in a unique developmental stage, whose 
actions result from social and environmental factors and who needs the protection and 
guidance of the state, led naturally to the development of a separate legal system with a 
unique philosophy.  The new juvenile court system was less concerned with the crime 
itself than with the problematic factors at work in the child’s life; thus, the system sought 
to provide treatment in an effort to change the child’s circumstances to put him or her on 
a path toward a productive adulthood.  This judicial model was a radical departure from 
the previous adversarial system in which juveniles were treated as adults and received 
similar sentences.  In the new court system, juvenile crime was seen as a civil matter, not 
a criminal one.  The courts took a parental stance, attempting to provide for the needs of 
the child.  Under this new civil, parental stance, due process protections were removed.  
Defense attorneys and formal hearings were viewed as unnecessary in a system that 
looked to nurture the development of the child (Grisso, 1981).   
 In exchange for a focus on rehabilitation, the juvenile court had forgone all due 
process rights afforded adults in the criminal system (Grisso, 1981).  It was this trade-off 
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that the Supreme Court examined and declared unconstitutional in the mid 1960s.  In 
Kent v. United States (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juvenile transfer hearings 
must meet the standards of due process and fair treatment, if juveniles were to be 
transferred to adult court.  Although this case established that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did apply to juveniles, the ruling was limited to a specific and, at the time, infrequent type 
of hearing (Grisso, 1981).  The more influential ruling came in response to In re Gault 
(1967), in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared that juveniles were entitled to the same 
due process protections as adults in all court proceedings.  In his majority opinion, Justice 
Fortas noted that juveniles were entitled to more than a “kangaroo court,” (In re Gault, 
1967, p.1444) and “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone” (p.1436).  In the case of Gault, the juvenile had not been informed of his right 
against self-incrimination nor his right to counsel at different stages of the legal process.  
The Court ruled his confession inadmissible for these reasons and set the stage for 
subsequent cases (e.g., West v. United States, 1968; Commonwealth v. McNeil, 1987; 
Commonwealth v. Guyton, 1989) in which further procedural protections were 
established.   
 The In re Gault ruling had a substantial impact on the juvenile court system.  The 
ruling was a radical departure from the 60-year tradition of the juvenile court (Feld, 
1987); due process protections were seen as antithetical to the previously held philosophy 
of rehabilitation by many in the system.  The rulings in both Gault and Kent, however, 
held that due process protections would not get in the way of the courts’ provisions of 
treatment and rehabilitation.  The underlying view in both cases was that the juvenile 
court system had failed to meet its aim of providing treatment and was, instead, giving 
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punishments in the form of confinement to training schools and other programs.  Because 
juvenile hearings could lead to confinement, the Court ruled that juveniles “in 
adjudicatory hearings have a valid claim to adequate notice, to legal counsel, to the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and to confront and cross-examine opposing 
witnesses,” (Grisso, 1981, p.5).  In its ruling on Gault, the Court clearly noted that it did 
not intend to end the separate juvenile system or to pattern all proceedings after adult 
criminal proceedings.  Rather, the juvenile court was to continue operating under the best 
interests of the child, recognizing the unique needs of individuals in this formative stage.  
When all it could provide was confinement, however, the court must be limited by due 
process rights and its formal protections (Grisso, 1981). 
1.2.1 Miranda and the Juvenile Court 
 The Miranda rights and warnings were established one year prior to the Gault 
ruling.  When due process rights were extended to juvenile court by the Gault and Kent 
rulings, Miranda became an issue for juveniles, as well (Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001).   
Cases soon came before the courts questioning juveniles’ abilities to comprehend and 
waive their rights in ways that met Miranda’s knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
requirements.  In People v. Lara (1967), the California Supreme Court decided that 
juvenile status alone did not invalidate a waiver of rights.  The court acknowledged that 
juveniles might not be able to fully comprehend their rights in ways that allow them to 
legitimately provide waivers, and that an individual youth’s ability must be decided in 
light of the “totality of circumstances” present in the case.  This ruling followed the 
historic philosophy of the court that the needs and circumstances of each child should be 
individually considered.  It did not specify any age or single factor that would serve as a 
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cut-off for determining the admissibility of a waiver.  The vagueness of the ruling made it 
difficult for police officers to know if a confession might later be deemed inadmissible, 
and judges had little guidance about what circumstances to consider (Grisso, 1981). 
 A federal appellate court attempted to further define the “totality of 
circumstances” test in West v. United States (1968).  The ruling followed in the tradition 
of  Lara and did not specify cut-offs requirements or specific combinations of factors that 
would suggest a waiver was invalid.  Instead the West ruling gave juvenile court judges a 
list of factors to consider.  These nine factors included consideration of the characteristics 
of a juvenile suspect (e.g., age, education, intelligence) and the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation (e.g., the availability of council to the juvenile, be it a 
relative or attorney) (Grisso, 1981).  In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court officially extended 
the “totality of circumstances” test to juveniles in Fare v. Michael C.  Although none of 
these rulings invalidated a juvenile’s ability to waive his or her rights, each 
acknowledged the juvenile’s greater risk for deficits that might invalidate a waiver 
(Grisso, 1998).        
       Interpreting a juvenile’s ability to waive his or her Miranda rights and applying due 
process to the juvenile system have continued to be challenges.  Although the Court has 
upheld the application of Miranda rights to juveniles, the right to a trial by jury was 
denied in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971).  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the non-
adversarial nature of the juvenile system was an asset and should not be changed.  The 
juvenile court has attempted to balance juveniles’ rights with the basic philosophy of the 
court, to provide treatment and rehabilitations in a less formal setting.  Questions, such as 
when to inform juveniles of their rights and how to apply due process in a way that is 
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sensitive to the unique needs of children, remain.  The special vulnerability of children 
was noted in the Gault ruling, and the Court recognized that procedures different from 
those seen in adult criminal court might be required to protect juveniles’ rights.  At the 
same time, the assumption was made that juveniles would be less vulnerable than before 
Gault because youth would now be informed of their rights.  What Gault did not consider 
was the possible limitations in juveniles’ abilities to understand and invoke the rights to 
silence and legal counsel (Grisso, 1981). 
1.2.2 Protections Afforded Juveniles 
 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the vulnerable position of juvenile 
suspects in its 1962 ruling, Gallegos v. Colorado.  The Court suggested that the presence 
of a lawyer or adult relative could put the child “on a less unequal footing with his 
interrogators” (p.1213). In response, many jurisdictions added the protection of an 
interested adult to the interrogation of minors (Grisso, 1998).  Police officers were to 
give the juvenile an opportunity to consult with a lawyer, parent, or guardian before 
waiving Miranda rights.  Over time, the parties who could serve as an interested adult 
and the required content of the meeting were defined by the courts (Commonwealth v. 
McNeil, 1987; Commonwealth v. Guyton, 1989).  The level of privacy afforded for such 
consultations continues to vary widely, as does the age specifications of the interested 
adult rule (i.e., generally applies to suspects between 14 and 16 years of age) (Oberlander 
& Goldstein, 2001). 
 Research has shown that the presence of an interested adult has not resulted in 
more juveniles refusing to waive their Miranda rights (Grisso, 1981; Grisso & Ring, 
1979).  In interrogation situations parents often encourage children to be truthful and do 
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as the police ask. Empirical evidence revealed that parents believed children should 
cooperate with the police and be responsible for their actions (Grisso, 1981; Grisso & 
Ring, 1979).  In 70% of consultations, parents offered no advice to youth about waiving 
Miranda rights, and 66% of parents did not say a word to their children (Grisso & Ring, 
1979).  If two-thirds of interested adults are not even speaking with the juvenile during 
the consultation process, this consultation may not be having the protective effect that 
was intended.  It seems that, for the most part, juveniles do not receive additional 
protection from the interested adults when deciding whether to waive their rights during 
interrogations. 
 In addition to the interested adult protection, youth are also protected by the 
“totality of circumstances” test.  Grisso (1981) examined the guidelines used by courts to 
evaluate a juvenile’s understanding of Miranda and found that, although courts 
consistently noted the “totality of circumstances” and cited no cut-offs or thresholds for 
comprehension, patterns could be seen in their rulings.  In a review of all appellate cases 
between 1948 and 1978, age and IQ were the most commonly cited reasons for declaring 
waivers invalid in the 40 cases found that addressed this question.  Courts seemed to 
consider observable or easily measured factors, such as age, IQ, literacy, previous contact 
with police, and factual details of the procedures used by the police to detain and question 
juveniles(Grisso, 1981). 
  In their considerations and decisions based on these factors, courts have not 
reported which factors were given more or less weight.  Thus, although it is impossible to 
tell which factors were seen by courts as most important, the factors noted by the courts 
can be reviewed.  In Grisso’s (1981) review, judges tended to rule that juveniles over 16 
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years of age had adequate understanding of their rights, and those under age 12 did not.  
Rulings on juveniles ages 13 through 15 were mixed.  In about half of all the cases 
reviewed, IQ scores were presented as evidence.  Although the courts have consistently 
refused to acknowledge any specific score that invalidates a waiver, most decisions of 
inadequate understanding involved juveniles with IQ scores below 75 (Grisso, 1981).  
Prior experience with the police and courts was a commonly noted factor in the appellate 
cases, and the U.S. Supreme court, in Fare v. Michael C. (1979) and Yarborough v. 
Alvarado (2004), established it as a factor in the totality if circumstances by noting the 
role of inexperience.  A reading level of 5th grade or higher was often used to indicate 
adequate ability to understand one’s rights, whereas a history of special education 
placement was viewed as an indication that the juvenile might not understand his or her 
rights (Grisso, 1981).   
1.3 Empirical Research on Juveniles’ Comprehension of Rights 
 Reviews of case rulings revealed the key factors used by judges to rule on 
juveniles’ abilities to comprehend and waive Miranda rights.  Research that has been 
conducted on juveniles’ comprehension of Miranda rights and factors that may impact 
juveniles’ decision making during interrogations has supported some of the conclusions 
drawn by judges.  However, findings also raise concerns that juveniles’ abilities may be 
somewhat overestimated by courts.   
 IQ and age are often cited as factors considered within the “totality of 
circumstances,” and both have been found, empirically, to be significantly related to 
comprehension of Miranda rights (Grisso, 1981; Goldstein et al., 2003).  As age and IQ 
increase, juveniles, typically, are better able to define each right and the key words used 
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in the Miranda warnings.  The effect of age seems to plateau at age 14; for those 
juveniles age 15 and 16, the interaction between age and IQ is a much stronger predictor 
of Miranda comprehension.  Understanding of youth over the age of 16 seems to parallel 
that of adults (Grisso 1981).   
In Grisso’s (1981) sample of juvenile offenders, those under age 15, and those 
ages 15 and 16 with IQs below 80, failed to meet the standard of comprehension that a 
panel of judges and lawyers determined adequate.  Although 15 and 16 year olds with 
average intelligence understood their rights as well as 17 through 22 year olds of equal 
intelligence, one-third to one-half of this group still did not exhibit adequate 
understanding (Grisso, 1981).  These findings highlight the importance of considering 
both the juvenile’s age and IQ in evaluating his or her comprehension of Miranda. 
Although the average IQ score in the general population is 100 (The 
Psychological Corporation, 1991), a study of 4,951 juvenile offenders found an average 
IQ score of 81.2 for boys and 78.2 for girls (Goldstein, Strachan, & Weil, 2006).  If 
intelligence is not carefully considered, the ability of the “average” juvenile offender to 
comprehend and apply Miranda rights may be overestimated.  In a review of all federal 
appellate cases between 1948 and 1978, 40 cases were found that examined the question 
of juveniles’ comprehension of the Miranda warning .  In about half of these cases, IQ 
scores were entered into evidence.  The youth’s understanding of the Miranda warning 
was considered inadequate in almost all cases where the youth’s IQ was below 75 
(Grisso, 1981).  The level of intellectual ability needed to adequately comprehend the 
Miranda warning may be underestimated by the courts.  Research has shown that even 
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those youth who scored between 80 and 100 on IQ measures only exhibited full 
understanding of their rights 50% of the time (Grisso, 1981).   
Some research has also been done on the effects of previous experience with the 
police and judicial system on comprehension of Miranda rights.  Although previous 
experience with the police has been cited by both the U.S. Supreme Court (Fare v. 
Michael C., 1979; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004) and the courts in several jurisdictions 
(e.g. State v. Prater, 1970; People v. Jenkins, 2004; Smith v. Mullin, 2004; A.M. v. Butler, 
2004) as evidence of better understanding of the Miranda warning, the research does not 
support this assumption.  Grisso (1981) examined juveniles’ Miranda comprehension 
scores, as well as their number of prior arrests, felony charges, misdemeanor charges, 
status offenses, and times they were held in detention facilities.  No differences were 
found between juveniles with more or less experience with the system.  Although these 
juveniles may have heard the Miranda warning more times, they did not exhibit greater 
comprehension.  It is relevant to note that when other demographic variables were 
included in the analysis, ethnicity was a significant moderator of the relationship between 
previous experience and Miranda comprehension.  White juvenile offenders’ scores on 
one measure of Miranda comprehension increased as the number of felony referrals 
increased.  Black juvenile offenders’ scores on the same measure decreased as the 
number of felony referrals increased.  This difference is not fully understood but seems 
primarily limited to juveniles with a combination of subaverage intelligence and low 
socioeconomic status.   
Research has also shown that simplified versions of the warning do not improve 
comprehension (Ferguson & Douglas, 1970), nor does legal education about rights (Wall 
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& Furlong, 1985).  After learning about the Miranda warning as part of a legal education 
curriculum, most students refused to waive their Miranda rights (81%) and could 
correctly answer true-false questions about the warning.  Students comprehension of 
important Miranda vocabulary, and the role of the right to silence, however, was 
inadequate even after education.  Research on the impact of education provides further 
evidence that exposure to the Miranda warning does not necessarily result in improved 
comprehension.  
   In Grisso’s (1981) study of 431 juvenile offenders between the ages of 10 and 
16, more than half demonstrated inadequate understanding of at least one prong of the 
Miranda warning.  Only 20% of the sample displayed adequate understanding of all four 
prongs.  Two-thirds of the sample showed inadequate understanding of at least one of the 
key vocabulary words used in the warning, with 60% of the sample lacking adequate 
understanding of the word “interrogation.”  These findings raise serious concerns about 
how well juveniles comprehend their rights.   The concept of interrogation is central to 
the idea of Miranda rights; if a juvenile does not understand what an interrogation is, 
he/she may be unable to apply the rights to his/her own interrogation.  As would be 
expected, research has shown that adolescents who comprehend their rights are more like 
to assert them in an interrogation (Abramovitch, Higgins-Biss, & Biss, 1993).     
2 THE CURRENT STUDY 
Between the 1970s and 2000, little research was conducted on juvenile offenders’ 
comprehension of Miranda rights.  The work that has been conducted utilizes the 
instrument Grisso developed and tested in his 1970s research, later published in 1998 as 
“Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights.”  This 
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tool includes several instruments that assess an individual’s comprehension of the 
warning, the important words that make up the warning, the nature of interrogation, the 
right to silence, and the right to legal counsel (see Methods section for a detailed 
description of the instruments).  In addition to its use in research, the instrument has been 
used to help evaluate the validity of Miranda waivers in court proceedings and is 
commonly cited in testimony (e.g., People v. Cole, 2005; State v. Griffin, 2005; People v. 
Jenkins, 2004; Com v. Woods, 2004; Smith v. Mullin, 2004; Martin v. State, 2004; T.S.D. 
v. State, 1999; Carter v. State, 1999; State v. Caldwell, 1992; People v. Phillips, 1992; 
Matter of Welfare of L.R.B., 1985).  Although a valuable assessment tool, the 
admissibility of the instruments has been questioned in some cases because of outdated 
Miranda vocabulary and lack of extensive publication by researchers other than the 
instruments’ author (People v. Cole, 2005; State v. Griffin, 2005; Carter v. State, 1997).  
On rare occasions, data from the instruments have been excluded from testimony because 
the norms for the measures were gathered in the 1970s, and courts assumed that general 
knowledge of and exposure to the Miranda warning changed since that time (e.g., T.S.D. 
v. State, 1999).   
Exposure to Miranda has increased over the years.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in its 2000 Dickerson ruling, “the [Miranda] warnings have become part of our national 
culture” (p.14).  The warning can be heard many times each day on television shows that 
depict police investigations and court proceedings.  In 1978, the primetime television 
line-up on the three major networks included five crime- or police-based shows (e.g., 
Chips, Starsky & Hutch), and three shows about private investigators (e.g., Charlie’s 
Angels, The Rockford Files) (“Prime Time Schedule, 1978-1979,” n.d.).  In 2005, the 
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same three networks have twelve shows on during primetime that detail criminal 
investigations and prosecutions (e.g., Law & Order, Crime Scene Investigation) (“ABC 
2005-06,” n.d.; “CBS 2005-06,” n.d.; “NBC 2005-06,” n.d.).  The number of primetime 
television shows exploring legal issues has increased since the 1970s, and such shows 
often include readings of the Miranda warning when suspects are arrested.  In addition to 
these primetime shows, there are many re-runs of shows, such as Law & Order, and 
movies depicting criminal investigations shown on cable channels each day.  Current 
shows also have shifted from a focus on police officer characters (e.g., Starsky & Hutch), 
to a focus on the legal process and aspects of criminal behavior and law (e.g., Law & 
Order). 
The increased presence of Miranda and other legal issues on television has 
increased the general population’s exposure to legal ideas.  Juvenile suspects are likely to 
have been highly exposed to these ideas through television.  Television watching is 
known to be negatively correlated with parental income and number of parents in the 
home, and positively correlated with non-white ethnicity (Gorely, Marshall & Biddle, 
2004).  These same factors have been found to put juveniles at risk for delinquency and 
arrest (Wasserman et. al, 2003; Hawkins et. al, 1998; Lipsey & Derzon, 1998; 
Stouthamer-Loeber, Loeber, Wei, Farrington, & Wikstrom 2002; Krisberg & Wolf, 
2005).   
Given the increased presence of the Miranda warning on television, it can be 
assumed that today’s juveniles, particularly youth at risk for contact with police, have 
more exposure to the Miranda warning than did their youthful counterparts in the 1970s.  
As noted previously, increased exposure to the Miranda warning and police practices are 
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viewed by the courts as evidence that youth should understand rights and be better 
prepared to make informed waiver decisions.  Although Grisso’s (1981) research showed 
that more contact with the police was not directly associated with better comprehension 
of Miranda rights, court opinions have repeatedly cited experience hearing one’s rights 
read during interrogations as evidence of Miranda comprehension (People v. Jenkins, 
2004; Smith v. Mullin, 2004; A.M. v. Butler, 2004).  Despite these court decisions and the 
increased presence of Miranda in U.S. culture, an empirical question remains.  Do 
today’s juveniles comprehend their rights better than did juveniles in the late 1970s?   
2.1 Development of Legal Understanding 
Findings from research on both the brain physiology of adolescents and the 
learning of legal concepts suggests that increased cultural exposure to the Miranda 
warning should not cause juveniles today to comprehend their rights better than did their 
counterparts in the 1970s.  In sum, studies have found that the superior frontal regions of 
the brain, known to control executive cognitive functioning, mature and grow during 
adolescence.  Growth in this area is thought to be the cause of the improved frontal lobe 
functioning seen in later adolescence and early adulthood (Sowell, Thompson, Tessner, & 
Toga, 2001).  These findings highlight the important point that, although cultural 
exposure to Miranda may change over time, certain developmental processes that may be 
required to comprehend and make informed decisions about complex legal issues may 
not be affected by these cultural shifts.   
The existing literature on the development of legal reasoning is, for the most part, 
theoretical.  Legal Development Theory (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1977), closely related to 
Kolhberg’s theory of moral development, suggests that the individual must experience 
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both a quantitative change in his or her amount of knowledge on a subject and a 
qualitative change in how he or she interprets, values, and understands this information 
(Levine & Tapp, 1977).  Although exposure to the Miranda warning via television and 
other forms of media might increase a juvenile’s quantitative knowledge of the warning, 
it should not provide the qualitative change required to develop a deeper understanding of 
the complex ideas involved.  Such a qualitative change requires a conflict in which new 
information does not fit with the individual’s currently held ideas (Lee et al., 2003; 
Festinger, 1957; Berlyne, 1960). This internal conflict motivates the person to develop a 
new understanding that can incorporate the new information, a process Piaget referred to 
as “equilibration” (Flavell, 1977).  This conceptual change is not the accumulation of 
facts required for quantitative knowledge; rather, it is a “revolutionary” process in which 
the old paradigm is abandoned for a new understanding (Strike & Posner, 1992). Studies 
of how to bring about conceptual change in students have proposed that new ideas must 
be convincingly presented if they are to bring about the desired change.  Students must be 
convinced that the new conceptual understanding is better than the old one (Posner, 
Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982).   
The revolutionary process required to change juveniles’ understanding of the 
Miranda warning is not likely to be started by hearing a warning quickly read on a 
television program or through other passive exposure to the warning in the media.  In 
fact, a substantial body of research has shown that individuals have incredible belief 
perseverance; that is, they will continue to hold on to a previously held idea despite 
extensive new evidence to the contrary (Lau, Lepper & Ross, 1976, as cited by Ross, 
Lepper, Strack & Steinmetz, 1977).  Although research in this area has focused on the 
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physical sciences, it also applies to how individuals understand legal concepts.  
Individuals exposed to demonstrations and even to entire classes that suggest a different 
understanding of a phenomenon show little to no change in their understanding of that 
event (e.g., Chapagne, Gunstone, & Klopfer, 1985; diSessa, 1982).   
Even if incorrect, individuals’ conceptions about the world often have strong 
explanatory power, appear to have evidentiary support, and are supported by an 
individual’s fundamental understanding of the world (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Zirbel, 
2004).  For example, a juvenile might possess the understanding that a person must obey 
the police.  This belief would explain why most citizens obey the police (e.g., following 
traffic regulations and other laws), would be supported by evidence found in daily 
interactions (e.g., people on the street and the television obeying the police), and would 
be in concordance with the juvenile’s fundamental understanding of authority and how 
the world operates.  If the same juvenile were to hear a quick, rote reading of the 
Miranda warning on television, it would include, “you have the right to remain silent.”  It 
is unlikely that hearing this information, even repeatedly, would change the juvenile’s 
belief that he/she must follow police orders, including police pressure to discuss a crime 
or incriminate oneself.  Passively hearing such information on television or from other 
media sources would not start the “revolutionary” process in which an old idea is 
abandoned for a new understanding that better accounts for the observed facts.   
Although evidence suggests that an accurate comprehension of the Miranda 
warning may be related to several developmental processes, the courts have cited the 
increased cultural exposure to the Miranda warning as evidence that juveniles’ 
comprehension has improved.  Under this assumption, juvenile Miranda comprehension 
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norms established by Grisso’s (1981) 1970s study have been challenged in some courts.  
The current study compared the understanding exhibited by juvenile justice youth in the 
late 1970s to those interviewed more than twenty years later, at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  Acquiring an understanding of complex legal issues, such as rights, is, likely, a 
complicated developmental process.  Thus, juveniles’ comprehension of Miranda rights 
should remain fairly consistent over time, despite increased cultural exposure from the 
1970s to the 21st century.     
2.2 Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Primary research question 
Although exposure to the Miranda warning has increased over time and become 
part of U.S culture, the comprehension exhibited by juveniles today will not differ 
significantly from the comprehension exhibited by juveniles assessed in the late 1970s.  
Both groups will score similarly on all four measures included in both the Instruments for 
Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights and the Miranda Rights 
Comprehension Instruments II.   
2.2.2 Preliminary Hypotheses 
In the 21st century sample: 
1. There will be no significant differences between the participants gathered from 
the three testing centers. 
a. Participants from the three testing centers will not differ on Miranda 
comprehension (CMR-II, CMR-R-II, CMV-II, and FRI scores), intelligence 
(VIQ scores), or key demographic variables (ethnicity, history of 
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placement in special education, number of arrests, and number of DHS 
commitments). 
i. It is expected that there may be a significant difference between 
testing centers on the key demographic variable of age.  The 
second Philadelphia area center was only used during the last year 
of collecting data.  At that point, most of the older subjects needed 
for the study had already been gathered.  For this reason, it is 
expected that the average age at the second Philadelphia area 
testing center may be younger than at the other centers used in the 
study. 
2. There will be no significant gender differences in Miranda comprehension. 
a. There will be no significant differences in the scores obtained by girls and 
boys on the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, CMV-II and FRI. 
3. The average age, IQ, and offense history of the 21st Century sample will not differ 
significantly from the average age, IQ, and offense history of the 1970s sample. 
4. Miranda comprehension scores obtained from the Instruments for Assessing 
Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights and scores obtained from the 
Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments-II will be comparable.   
a. In the sub-sample of youth tested with both the original and updated 
instruments, there will be no significant differences in the scores juveniles 
obtain on the CMR and CMR-II, the CMR-R and CMR-R-II, the CMV and 
CMV-II. 
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2.2.3 Primary Hypotheses: Quantitative 
1. The comprehension scores of juveniles from the 21st century sample will not 
differ significantly from the scores of juveniles from the 1970s. 
a. The two groups will score similarly on the CMR and CMR-II, the CMR-R 
and CMR-R-II, the CMV and CMV-II, and the FRI. 
b. The proportion of youth in the 21st century sample exhibiting adequate, 
questionable, and inadequate understanding of the four prongs of the 
Miranda warning in the CMR-II will be similar to the proportion of youth 
in the 1970s study who exhibited adequate, questionable,  and inadequate 
understanding of the warning in the CMR.  The same relationship will be 
seen with the CMR-R-II and CMR-R and the CMV-II and CMV. 
2. The same key variables will be strongly correlated with Miranda comprehension 
in both the 1970s and 21st century samples. 
a. As Grisso found in the 1970s sample, IQ and age will be the variables 
most strongly associated with Miranda rights comprehension in the new 
sample. 
3. The relationship between age, IQ, and CMR-II scores in the 21st century sample 
will be similar to the relationship found between age, IQ, and CMR scores in the 
1970s sample. 
a. As seen with scores on the CMR in the 1970s sample, age and IQ will be 
significantly related to CMR-II scores.   When scores on the CMR-II are 
examined by age, 13, 14, and 15 year olds will score significantly lower 
than 17, 18, and 19 year olds.  Scores of 16 year olds will not differ 
significantly from the scores of either of the two age groups.  There will 
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be no significant differences between the scores of 16, 17, 18, and 19 year 
olds on the CMR-II.   
b. As seen with scores on the CMV in the 1970s sample, when scores on the 
CMV-II are examined by IQ classification and age, 13 and 14 year olds 
will score significantly lower than ages 15 and above.  The scores of 15 
and 16 year olds will not differ significantly from the scores of 17, 18, and 
19 year olds.    
4. Just as in the 1970s sample, there will be no simple relationship between previous 
experience with the police and Miranda comprehension.   
a. In the 21st century sample there will be no significant relationship between 
number of arrests and scores on the CMV-II and CMR-II or between 
number of DHS commitments and scores on the CMV-II and CMR-II 
when ethnicity is not included in the analysis.  Ethnicity will be examined 
as a potential moderator of the relationship between experience and scores 
on the CMV-II and CMR-II. 
Previous research has indicated that ethnicity may moderate the relationship 
between experience and Miranda comprehension.  In the 1970s study, Grisso (1981) 
found that CMR scores decreased as experience increased for African-Americans, but that 
CMR scores increased as experience increased for white participants.  No such 
relationship was seen between experience and CMV scores.  Preliminary analyses on the 
Massachusetts portion of the 21st century sample indicate that Miranda comprehension of 
Latino youth decreased as the number of police detainments in which the warning was 
read (as reported by the youth) increased (Goldstein et al., 2003).  No such relationship 
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was seen for African-American youth.  Because the results of previous research vary, no 
specific relationship between ethnicity, experience, and Miranda comprehension is 
hypothesized.  The relationship between youth of different ethnic groups and the police 
can vary over time and by community.  It may be influenced by the ethnic make-up of 
both the community and the police force, as well as the socioeconomic status of the 
community.  For these reasons, it is possible that the relationship between ethnicity, 
experience, and Miranda comprehension may change over time.       
2.2.4 Primary Hypotheses: Descriptive 
1. When youth in the two samples misunderstand aspects of the Miranda warning, 
they will make similar types of errors.   
a. The mistakes made by youth from the 21st century sample on the CMR-II 
will be similar to the misunderstandings exhibited by youth in the 1970s 
sample on the CMR. 
i. The first prong of the Miranda warning (right to silence) will be 
misinterpreted most often as a statement that one must be silent. 
ii. When the second prong of the Miranda warning (statements will 
be used in court) is misunderstood, it will be interpreted most often 
to mean that any lying or disobedience can result in negative 
consequences in court.  It will not include the aspect that truthful 
statements that may be self-incriminating can also be used against 
the defendant in court.   
iii. When the third prong of the Miranda warning (right to an attorney 
before and during interrogations) is misunderstood, the time and 
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place an attorney can be obtained will be unclear or unspecified 
(even after query from the examiner).   
b. The errors in defining key vocabulary words made by youth from the 21st 
century sample (on the CMV-II) will be similar to the errors made by their 
counterparts in the 1970s (on the CMV). 
i. “Interrogation” will most often be defined as a court hearing, or the 
youth will be unable to give any definition. 
ii. “Consult” will most often be defined as talking to someone.  The 
purpose of seeking advice will not be included in the definition. 
iii. “Right” will most often be defined as something one can do.  Even 
after prompting from the examiner, the definition will not include 
the notion that a right is protected. 
c. As in the 1970s sample, juveniles in the 21st century sample will 
commonly misinterpret Warning III on the CMR-R-II, believing that a 
social worker is synonymous with an attorney. 
d. Juveniles in the 21st century sample will make errors similar to those of 
juveniles in the 1970s in their understanding of the function of rights (on 
the FRI). 
i.  The most common misconceptions about the reasons lawyers seek 
the truth (item 9 on the Right to Counsel subscale) will include: 
that the lawyer must report all information to the court (most 
common), that the lawyer would not advocate for a guilty juvenile, 
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and that the lawyer is similar to a judge and will decide guilt 
and/or punishment. 
ii.  A majority of youth will believe that a suspect must talk about an 
alleged offense if ordered to by the judge (item 15 on the Right to 
Silence subscale). 
3 METHODS 
 In order to compare juveniles’ comprehension of their Miranda Rights in the 
1970s to that of juveniles today, two sets of data were compared.  The first data were 
from Grisso’s original study (1981).  The data from that study, gathered in the 1970s, no 
longer exist; both the raw data and the punch cards used to analyze them deteriorated to 
the point at which they became unusable. Therefore, published results and analyses of 
Grisso’s data were compared with results from the 21st century sample.  The participants 
in, measures for, and procedures used in each data set’s collection are described below. 
3.1 Grisso’s 1970s Study 
3.1.1 Participants 
 A total of 485 youth participated in the study.  Three hundred fifty-nine juveniles 
between ten and 16 years of age were tested in a court detention center, representing 
nearly the entire population1 of juveniles in the center during the 11-month period in 
which data were collected, provided they met the following requirements: (1) remained in 
the center for 24 hours, (2) were not charged with a felony, (3) were not excluded 
because of emotional state at the time of testing, and (4) volunteered to participate in the 
study.  Another 72 juveniles were tested in boys town and boys school facilities.  The 
additional juveniles were tested to increase the sample size of certain age and racial 
                                                 
1 An exact percentage is not given. 
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groups. Participants’ ages ranged from 10 to 16 years (M = 14.6, SD = 1.2).  The sample 
was 59.4% male, 40.6% female.  The ethnicity breakdown was 73.3% Caucasian and 
26.7% Black or African-American.  To check whether the sample collected was 
representative of the detention center population, demographic information was collected 
from all juveniles at the center for the first three months of the 11-month testing period.  
The demographic information of all juveniles over the 3-month period was compared 
with the sample of 431 juveniles (359 from the court detention center and 72 from the 
boys town and boys school facilities) between the ages of 10 and 16.  Some differences in 
offense history were observed, but no significant differences were found between the 
groups on offense history or on any other demographic characteristics.  Thus, Grisso 
concluded that the group of juveniles tested was representative of the detention center 
population (1981). 
 In addition to the 431 juveniles 10 through 16 years of age, data were also 
collected from 54 youth ages 17 through 19.  Half of these participants were tested as part 
of the adult offender sample, and the other half were tested as part of the adult non-
offender sample gathered by Grisso (1981) at the same time.  The offender and non-
offender samples were combined for most analyses because few if any differences were 
seen between the groups.  The offender sample’s previous experience with the law did 
not improve Miranda comprehension.   
 The offender portion of the sample was made up of 27 male and female 
volunteers residing in four St. Louis area halfway houses who were on either probation or 
parole.  The 27 non-offender participants were volunteers obtained in a variety of settings 
(e.g., custodial services, maintenance workers at a university and in a hospital).      
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3.1.2 Measures 
Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights. 
Comprehension of Miranda Rights was assessed using Grisso’s Instruments for 
Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (1998).  The instruments 
were originally developed for a research project and were later published in 1998.  The 
study was conducted in the St. Louis metropolitan area, and the instruments contain the 
wording of the Miranda warning used in that jurisdiction in the 1970s.  The measure 
consists of the following four instruments: 
(1) Comprehension of Miranda Rights (CMR).  This instrument was designed to 
be an objective measure of the examinee’s understanding of the standard Miranda 
warning.  Each of the four prongs of the Miranda warning is read aloud by the examiner, 
and the examinee is asked to explain the right in his or her own words.  Using 
standardized criteria and inquiries, the examiner rates the explanation as adequate (2 
points), questionable (1 point), or inadequate (0 points).  Total scores on this measure 
range from 0 to 8.   
(2) Comprehension of Miranda Rights- True or False (CMR-TF).  Later referred 
to as the Comprehension of Miranda Rights-Recognition (CMR-R) (in the 1998 
publication of the instruments), the CMR-R evaluates the individual’s comprehension of 
the four prongs of the Miranda warning without requiring verbal expressive abilities.  
The examiner reads one prong of the warning and then asks the examinee whether 
another sentence means the same thing as the sentence from the warning.  Three 
sentences are read for each of the four prongs, with scores on the CMR-R ranging from 0-
12.  Correct responses receive 1 point; incorrect responses receive 0 points. 
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(3) Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary (CMV).  The CMV evaluates the 
examinee’s understanding of six key words used in the Miranda warning.  The examiner 
reads each word, uses it in a sentence, and then reads the word again.  The examinee is 
asked to give the meaning of the word.  Scores on the CMV range from 0 to 12, and each 
response is scored as adequate (2 points), questionable (1 point), or inadequate (0 point).   
(4) Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).    The FRI was developed 
throughout the research project; thus, the final version of the FRI was administered only 
to the last 105 participants in the study.  The FRI uses hypothetical vignettes to assess the 
individual’s understanding of the function and significance of Miranda rights during 
interrogation and in legal proceedings.  The examiner shows the examinee a picture and 
reads a short vignette to establish the context.  The examinee is then asked several 
questions.  A total of 15 questions are asked about the 4 pictures and vignettes.  Three 
areas of understanding are assessed and result in the following subscales: (1) Nature of 
Interrogation Subscale (NI) (i.e., assesses the examinee’s perception of the role of the 
police and suspect in an interrogation), (2) Right to Counsel Subscale (RC) (i.e., assesses 
the examinee’s perception of the role of an attorney in legal proceedings), and (3) Right 
to Silence Subscale (RS) (i.e., assesses the examinee’s perception of the right to remain 
silent during different stages of legal proceedings).  Each response is scored as adequate 
(2 points), questionable (1 point), or inadequate (0 points), with total scores ranging from 
0 to 30.   
Test-retest reliability of the CMR was examined by calculating the Pearson r 
coefficient (r= .84) (Grisso, 1998).  Test-retest reliability was not examined for the other 
Miranda Warning Comprehension     36 
components of the Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of 
Miranda Rights.   
Inter-rater reliability of Grisso’s individual instruments was as follows: (1) CMR 
(r= .92 to .96, across pairs of scorers), (2) CMV (r= .97 to .98), (3) FRI (r= .94 to .96) 
(Grisso, 1998).  Inter-rater reliability of the CMR-R  was not examined because scoring 
requires no judgment or interpretation by the examiner.      
 The construct validity of the instruments was established during Grisso’s study; 
performance on the instruments correlated with factors theoretically related to Miranda 
comprehension, such as general intelligence and age.  The warning used in the instrument 
is taken from the jurisdiction in which the juveniles tested were charged.  Thus, the 
content validity of the instrument is excellent for the sample in the 1970s study.    The 
content validity may be reduced in other jurisdictions that use different versions of the 
warning. 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised. 
 The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R; 1974) is a 
standardized measure of intelligence (Flanagan & Kaufman, 2004).  The Similarities, 
Vocabulary, and Block Design subtests of the WISC-R were administered to participants, 
and an IQ score was prorated on scores from these subtests (participants between the ages 
of 17 and 19 were administered the same three subtests from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale).  The three subtests were chosen because, of any of the WISC-R 
subtests, they consistently showed the highest correlations with Full Scale IQ (Wechsler, 
1974) and because an IQ prorated from these three subtests was found to correlate with 
Full Scale IQ at or above .90 (Wechsler, 1955).   
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 Test re-test (Similarities, r=.81, Vocabulary, r=.82, and Block Design, r=.81) and 
interrater reliability have been found repeatedly to be high, and the construct and content 
validity of the WISC-R  have been repeatedly established (Wechsler, 1974).   
Review of court records.  
 The following information was obtained for each subject from the court’s 
computer storage of juveniles’ files: (1) age; (2) sex; (3) race; (4) local address, used to 
classify socioeconomic group; (5) number of prior arrests for felony charges; (5) number 
of prior misdemeanor referrals; (7) number of prior referrals for “status offenses”; (8) 
total number of prior referrals; and (9) number of prior detentions (Grisso, 1981).  
3.1.3 Procedures 
 The procedures for the 1970s study were carefully developed with the help of the 
St. Louis University Internal Review Board and the St. Louis County Juvenile Court, 
including the court’s judiciary, legal staff, public defender, social service chiefs, and 
detention center supervisor.  Special attention was paid to ethical concerns, specifically to 
the voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality. 
Parental consent to participate in research was obtained for all juveniles in the 
boys town and boys school samples.  Parental consent was not obtained for the sample of 
juveniles from the detention center.  State law did not require parental consent for the 
testing and interviewing of juveniles in detention.  Detained juveniles were temporary 
wards of the court and consent authority was given to the juvenile court judge and/or to 
the officer to whom the judge delegated authority.  Although research staff originally 
intended to seek parental consent for youth under the age of 18, several factors, including 
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the short length of time juveniles remained in the center and the rarity of parental visits, 
made obtaining parental consent impossible. 
 Given all of the relevant circumstances, the review boards concluded that 
detained youth could be approached to volunteer for the research study if: (1) the court, 
as guardian, gave approval; (2)  methods were in place to screen prospective individuals 
and avoid negative emotional reactions to testing by vulnerable juveniles; (3) testing was 
completed after the juvenile had been in detention for a minimum of 24 hours; and (4) an 
adequate plan was in place to obtain informed consent from juveniles and to maintain 
confidentiality.  A social worker was appointed by the court to screen juveniles for 
participation in the study, and the court approved, in principle, the participation of 
detained juveniles.  Approximately one out of every 12 juveniles did not participate in the 
study because either the social worker screened out the youth because of unusual 
emotional behavior or because the youth declined to participate.  Informed assent or 
consent was obtained by a research assistant on the juvenile’s detention unit. Each 
juvenile was interviewed individually by a trained research assistant. 
All participants in the offender and non-offender samples of youth ages 17 
through 19 were approached by a research assistant at the halfway house (offenders) or 
their place of employment (non-offenders).  Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants, and each participant met individually with a trained research assistant.    
3.2 The 21st Century Sample 
3.2.1 Participants 
 Data were collected from 185 juveniles at three facilities, as part of a larger on-
going study to develop norms and establish psychometric properties for the Miranda 
Rights Comprehension Instruments- II (MRCI-II), the revised version of the Instruments 
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for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights. Data were collected 
from 57 boys in a residential post-adjudication facility in Massachusetts, 16 participants 
in a short-term holding facility for youths adjudicated delinquent and awaiting placement 
in the greater Philadelphia area, and 113 participants in Philadelphia’s detention center.  
Two participants from the Massachusetts testing center were transferred from the facility 
before completing study procedures and, thus, were removed from the study.  A total of 
183 youth are included in the 21st century study.  Ages ranged from 12 to 19; however 
only one 12 year old youth participated.  Although we attempted to include younger 
youth (ages 10, 11, and 12), we were unable to do so; youth of these ages were rarely 
placed in the participating facilities.   See Table 1 for demographics of the sample. All 
participants in Pennsylvania were represented by the Philadelphia Defender Association, 
had no open cases involving confessions at the time of participation, and were not 
excluded by the Participant Advocates (i.e., a member of the treatment or social work 
staff at each center who ensures that the youth is emotionally fit to be approached about 
participating in research and if so, that they youth is appropriately informed of study 
procedures and appears to understand the nature of participation) at the facilities as unfit 
to participate at the time.   
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Table 1 
21st Century Demographics by Testing Center 
 Testing Center  
 MA Center 
(males only) 
PA Center 1 PA Center 2 Total 
Gender     
Male n = 55  78 7 140 




M = 15.80  









    
Asian n = 3 0 0 3 










White non-Hispanic 19 10 1 30 












Number of Previous 
Arrests 
 
M = 5.35  








Number of Previous 
Detentions 
 
M = 4.22  









Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments-II (MRCI-II).   
 Comprehension of Miranda rights was assessed using the MRCI-II, the revised 
version of the Instruments of Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda 
Rights (Grisso, 1998).  The MRCI-II includes a fifth prong of the Miranda warning in 
each relevant instrument, and involves updated Miranda language to represent the 
simplified warnings used in most jurisdictions today.  A fifth instrument, Perceptions of 
Coercion during the Holding and Interrogation Process (P-CHIP) was added to assess 
juveniles’ self-reported likelihood of offering false confessions given specific police 
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interrogation behaviors.  This instrument was administered to participants, but resulting 
data were not included in the current study because no comparable instrument was used 
in the 1970s research.  The following four instruments of the MRCI-II were analyzed as 
part of the current study; the purpose and format of each instrument remains the same as 
in Grisso’s version, but specific changes from the original version are highlighted here. 
 (1) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II (CMR-II).   The language of each prong 
of the warning was updated, and the fifth prong was included.  Scoring criteria from the 
CMR are used, with scoring for the fifth prong developed using a similar process to that 
used in the original creation of the instrument, and the new item and scoring criteria were 
reviewed by a panel of psycho-legal experts.  Scores on the CMR-II range from 0 to10.     
 (2) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-Recognition-II (CMR-R-II).  The 
instrument was updated to include the modern wording of the warning, as well as the fifth 
prong.  The CMR-R-II uses the same comparison sentences as the CMR-R for the first 
four prongs of the warning.  The comparison sentences for the fifth prong of the warning 
were created to parallel the sentences used in the CMR-R’s four warnings.  The new items 
and scoring criteria were reviewed by a panel of psycho-legal experts.  Scoring is 
identical to that used on the CMR-R, with scores on the CMR-R-II ranging from 0 to 15. 
 (3) Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).  The FRI used in the MRCI-II is 
identical to that included in the Instruments for Assessing Understanding and 
Appreciation of Miranda Rights.   Two items from the Nature of Interrogation subscale 
were omitted from the data collected in Massachusetts; because the P-CHIP includes 
questions about how the suspect would be feeling at the time of interrogation, the two 
questions in the FRI asking how the suspect and police might be feeling were viewed as 
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unnecessary.  However, for comparison with the original dataset these two questions 
were added back into the FRI when it was administered to the 21st Century participants 
collected in the Philadelphia area. 
(4) Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II  (CMV-II).  The CMV-II includes 
18 words, 12 in addition to the original six used in the CMV.  The additional words were 
included to extend the utility of the instruments to jurisdictions with alternate wordings of 
the Miranda warning.  The scoring of the new items parallels Grisso’s original criteria.  
A panel of experts reviewed the new items and scoring criteria prior to use.  Scores on the 
revised instrument range from 0-36.   
 Based on preliminary analyses, test-retest reliability for the instruments within the 
MRCI-II is as follows: (1) CMR-II (r=.61), (2) CMR-R-II (r=.75), (3) FRI (r=.58), and (4) 
CMV-II (r=.77) (Mesiarik, Goldstein, & Thomson, 2002).   
By examining the relationship between Miranda comprehension, age, and Verbal 
IQ, Goldstein and colleagues (2003) established the construct validity of the measure.  
Using regression analyses, Verbal IQ and age each independently predicted Miranda 
comprehension (bage = .07, SEage = .02, p < .01; bVIQ = .01, SEVIQ = .002, p < .01) 
(Goldstein et al., 2003).  
  The established content validity of the original instruments serves as the basis for 
the content validity of the MRCI-II.  Additions and changes to the instrument have 
followed the format and logic originally used by Grisso.  The additions to the instruments 
and scoring criteria were reviewed by attorneys and psychologists specializing in 
Miranda warnings.  The content validity of the measure is further established by the use 
of situations commonly encountered by youth in interrogation situations (Goldstein et al., 
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2003).  An independent study to validate the scoring criteria of the MRCI-II is currently 
underway (Goldstein, Mesiarik, Kalbeitzer, & Strachan, in preparation).  More than 1,000 
attorneys will be asked to score sample responses to items on the MRCI-II.  The scores 
given by attorneys will be compared to the scoring criteria listed in the MRCI-II manual.    
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). 
 The WASI is a standardized measure of intellectual functioning (The 
Psychological Corporation, 1999).  The WASI measures both Verbal IQ (VIQ) and 
Performance IQ (PIQ).  The two subscales are known to have a high correlation, and the 
verbal abilities measured by the VIQ subscale are most relevant to Miranda 
comprehension.  For this reason, as well as the need to limit testing time, only the verbal 
subtests of the WASI are administered to participants.  A VIQ score is produced from 
participants’ scores on the Vocabulary (measures expressive vocabulary and verbal 
knowledge) and Similarities (measures general intellectual ability, as well as abstract 
reasoning and conceptual verbal understanding) subtests (The Psychological Corporation, 
1999). 
 Inter-rater reliability is excellent for both verbal scales of the WASI (Vocabulary, 
r=.98, Similarities, r=.99).  Test-retest reliability of the WASI Verbal IQ scores is strong, 
as well (r=.92) (The Psychological Corporation, 1999).  The content and construct 
validity of the WASI have been repeatedly established (The Psychological Corporation, 
1999).     
Demographic questionnaire.  
 Each participant was asked a brief set of questions to gather non-identifying 
demographic information.  Information on the participants’ general demographic 
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information (e.g., age, ethnicity, highest grade completed, history of special education), 
social environment (e.g., number of adults living at home; number of parents living at 
home; number of relatives, good friends, or associates in juvenile detention or adult 
jail/prison), legal history (e.g., age at first arrest, number of times arrested, delinquencies 
that resulted in commitment, most serious arrest, number of previous detentions), and 
Miranda history (e.g., number of times detained by police in which Miranda was read, 
recollection of the Miranda warning, recollection of discussing the Miranda warning 
with lawyer, other sources of information about the Miranda warning) were collected. 
 In addition to the measures described in this section, all participants were 
administered the Wechsler Individual Achievement Tests (WIAT) (The Psychological 
Corporation, 1992).  Participants recruited in the Philadelphia area were also 
administered the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-II (GSS-II).  These measures are being 
used to address separate research questions as part of the larger project, but they were not 
included in the current study.  
3.2.3 Procedures 
 The procedures used for the 21st century sample were designed to follow those 
established by the 1970s study as closely as possible.  In Massachusetts, researchers 
worked with the Department of Youth Services and the detention facility to develop and 
implement study procedures.  Procedures used in the Philadelphia area paralleled those 
used in Massachusetts; however, because of differences in state regulations and custodial 
policies, some recruitment procedures had to be altered.  Modified procedures were 
carefully developed with the help of the Philadelphia Defender Association, the 
Department of Human Services, the local facilities, and the Drexel University Internal 
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Review Board.  Special attention was given to ensure the protection of juveniles for 
whom parental consent could not be obtained.  
 For the 57 boys whose data were collected in Massachusetts, blanket consent was 
provided by the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services to approach youth in a 
residential, post-adjudication facility (the state had custody of all delinquent youth placed 
in residential facilities).  Parents of youth younger than 18 years of age were contacted by 
mail and invited to decline their child’s participation by returning a form in a pre-
addressed, stamped envelope or by calling the investigator.  No parents declined.  Before 
a youth was approached, his participation was cleared by an advocate from the facility 
(regarding mental health and behavior at the time of intended testing).  Assent was 
obtained from every youth under 18 years of age, and consent was obtained for those 
youth 18 years of age.  No youth declined to participate.  Each participant met 
individually with a trained research assistant to complete all measures.   
The remainder of the sample, collected in the Philadelphia area, was recruited 
using lists of eligible participants provided by the Philadelphia Defender Association.  
The lists included all youths the Defender Association represented who were housed in 
the designated detention facilities and did not have open cases that involve confessions.  
The Defender Association provided the youths’ names and ages, as well as their legal 
guardians’ contact information.  If a youth was under 18 years of age, five attempts were 
made to reach the guardian over a 72 hour period.  If a guardian was reached and agreed 
to a youth’s participation, consent forms were mailed to the address designated by the 
guardian.   
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Of the lists received, approximately 45% of guardians were reached.  Once 
reached, approximately 57% verbally agreed and 8% declined participation.  The 
remaining 36% reported that the youth had already been discharged from the facility.  Of 
the guardians who verbally agreed, approximately 22% returned the consent forms 
mailed to them.  When a consent form was received by research staff, assent was then 
sought from the youth.  If the guardian did not return the consent form, the youth was not 
approached by research staff.  Consent was sought directly from youths listed by the 
Defender Association who were 18 years of age or older.  If the parent of a youth under 
18 years of age was unreachable, assent was sought from the youth in the presence of a 
Participant Advocate. Each participant met individually with a trained research assistant 
to complete all measures. 
3.3 The Current Study 
3.3.1 Quantitative Analyses  
The book describing the results of the 1970s study, Juvenile’s Waiver of Rights: 
Legal and Psychological Competence (Grisso, 1981) and all related articles were 
reviewed.  All findings from these sources on the juvenile offender and young adult 
populations were recorded.  The data from the 21st century sample was analyzed using 
the same statistics reported in the book to produce comparable results. 
 Prior to any analysis, the FRI scores of participants from Massachusetts were 
adjusted to correct for the two questions not included in the version of the FRI given to 
those participants.  Their scores were adjusted to be out of 30 points, the total number of 
potential points on the full FRI. 
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3.3.2 Descriptive Analyses 
Grisso’s results were reviewed, and all descriptions of typical misunderstanding 
of individual CMR, CMR-R, CMV, and FRI items were recorded.  In order to compare the 
two samples, 21st century questionable or inadequate responses were recorded for each 
item of these instruments that Grisso provided a description of his 1970s results, .  Two 
independent reviewers (one familiar with Grisso’s descriptions of his 1970s results and 
one blinded to these results) grouped 21st century item responses into categories of 
misunderstanding.  The two raters independently produced nearly identical categories, 
differing only in their labeling of these categories, not in their content (e.g., “negative 
actions will be told to the court and used against you”, versus, “things bad, negative or 
wrong will get you in trouble and be used in court”).  Before finalizing the categorization 
of 21st century responses, the raters met and came to agreement on the most 
representative descriptive label for each type of error.         
3.3.3 Limitations of the Comparison 
Comparing two separate data sets gathered almost thirty years apart has inherent 
limitations.  It is impossible to replicate, or perfectly control for, the physical, social, 
educational, and socioeconomic environment of the 1970s participants.  Even in the same 
communities of St. Louis County from which the 1970s sample was gathered, changes in 
state and local policies, neighborhood schools, and socioeconomic status would affect 
results in ways that would be difficult to identify and quantify.  Given the inherent 
differences in samples, this study, therefore, could not directly examine how Miranda 
comprehension changed over time.  This study did, however, allow us to examine the 
relationships between relevant youth characteristics and Miranda comprehension to 
determine if the relationships have changed since the 1970s.  This study also allowed us 
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to examine various aspects of Miranda comprehension to see if a sample of today’s youth 
demonstrates similar levels of understanding to that observed in the 1970s. 
It is important to note that the 21st century sample differed from the 1970s sample 
in a few important ways.  The 21st century sample was more ethnically diverse and was 
predominantly composed of youth from urban areas.  In the 1970s sample, half of 17 
through 19 year old youths were gathered from the community, and half were on 
probation or parole.  Youth ages 17 through 19, in the 21st century sample, were gathered 
at the juvenile justice facilities.  Furthermore, transfer policies certainly affected which 
youth, ages 17 through 19, were placed in juvenile facilities.  As such, it is likely that the 
21st century youth participants committed less serious offenses than did their 1970s 
counterparts, and, therefore, the older youth in the two samples could differ in important 
ways. Despite these key differences between samples, examination of study differences 
in measures and procedures suggests that the two studies are not so different as they may 
first appear. 
Because the court provided consent for the 1970s study, any resident of the 
detention center who met eligibility criteria was a potential participant and could be 
approached by research staff.  In the 21st century study, similar procedures were in place 
for the data gathered in the Massachusetts center, because the state had legal custody and 
decision making rights for juvenile offenders.  In the Philadelphia area centers, however, 
the state did not have the legal right to consent to youths’ research participation.  
Consequently, only youth represented and referred by the Philadelphia Defender 
Association could be approached by research staff after attempting to reach their 
parent/guardian for permission.  Although this may have changed the pool of potential 
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participants slightly, the Philadelphia Defender Association represents approximately 
70% of the youth charged and housed in Philadelphia’s detention center (S.Simkins, J.D., 
personal communication, June 6, 2006).  Therefore, the majority of youth in the center 
were potential participants.  The 21st century participants from the Philadelphia area were 
limited by the exclusion of any youths with open cases involving confessions.  The 1970s 
sample was similarly limited by the exclusion of any youths with felony charges.  
As part of the 21st century study, researchers attempted to obtain consent from the 
youths’ guardians. Call procedures do not exclude youth whose guardians do not have 
phones (five attempts to locate phone numbers are made before approaching the youth 
with the Participant Advocate).  Approximately 425 phone calls have been made as part 
of the study; thus far, guardians were reached in about 45% of those calls.  Less than 8% 
of guardians who were reached by research staff verbally declined participation.  A small 
group of these guardians declined participation after hearing information regarding the 
study procedures.  In most cases, however, the guardian did not allow the researcher to 
explain the study before declining, and others gave permission but did not wish to have 
forms sent to their homes and were, therefore, excluded and considered to have declined.  
Of the forms sent to parents, 22% were returned, but only one-third of those parentally 
consented youth were able to be tested.  Generally, this failure to test was because the 
youth had left the center by the time the signed consent form was received from the 
parent.  Thus, 6% of the total sample was obtained with guardian’s consent, while 94% of 
the sample was obtained using an in-house participant advocate, a procedure very similar 
to that used with all detention center youth in the 1970s study.  Similarly, approximately 
17% of the 1970s study was collected at the boys town and boys school facilities where 
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parental consent was sought for all participants.  Thus, although there are differences in 
the ways the 1970s and 21st century samples were gathered, the recruitment procedures of 
the two studies yielded comparable samples and, more importantly, the testing 
procedures of the two studies were nearly identical.    Descriptive analyses were run on 
the 21st century sample and compared with characteristics of the 1970s sample to check 
comparability on all relevant characteristics.   
Youth in 21st century and 1970s samples also differed in the IQ measures they 
completed.  The 1970s study used three subtests of the WISC-R (Wechsler, 1974), while 
participants in the 21st century study completed two subtests of the WASI (The 
Psychological Corporation, 1999).  Although the Psychological Corporation has not 
published the correlation between the WISC-R and WASI, it is known that scores on the 
WASI and WISC-III have a correlation of r=.72 for Vocabulary and r=.69 for Similarities 
(The Psychological Corporation, 1999).  Furthermore, scores on the WISC-III are highly 
correlated with scores on the WISC-R (Verbal IQ, r=.90; Vocabulary, r=.77; and 
Similarities, r=.74) (The Psychological Corporation, 1991).  Thus, it is assumed that the 
scores obtained by the 1970s sample on the WISC-R can be compared with scores 
obtained by the 21st century sample on the WASI.   
The method of gathering demographic information, including number of arrests 
and previous detentions, varied between the two studies.  In the 1970s study, youths’ 
offense histories were taken from court records.  With the 21st century sample, 
researchers were not provided access to court records; instead, youth were asked to recall 
the number of times arrested and history of charges.  Although this method was less than 
idea, a recent study comparing court records to youths’ self-reports was completed at the 
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Philadelphia detention center where the majority of participants were recruited; this study 
found a moderate positive correlation between self-reports of criminality and court 
records (Brame, Fagan, Piquero, Schubert & Steinberg, 2004).  Therefore, 21st century 
youths’ reports probably provide fairly accurate reflections of criminal history; 
consequently, we used these self-reports to examine the relationship between arrest 
history and Miranda comprehension in the same way that Grisso used court record data 
in the 1970s study.  Similarly, in the 1970s study, the number of previous detentions was 
obtained from court records, but, in the 21st century sample, youth provided this 
information through self-report.  A recent study found a .9 correlation between youths’ 
self-reports of placements in different detention centers and official records of placement 
(E. Mulvey, personal communication, August 15, 2006).  Therefore, it is also assumed 
that youths’ self-reports in the 21st century sample provided a fairly accurate report of the 
number of previous detentions.     
3.3.4 Method of Analyses 
Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses.  Effect sizes were examined for all 
hypotheses that proposed a null finding.  An effect less than a small effect size (i.e. using 
Cohen’s effect size values; Cohen 1988) was interpreted as supporting the null 
hypothesis.  Given the sample sizes, analysis revealed a power of .99 to detect a medium 
effect size, with alpha set at .05 for the primary hypothesis (1a).  There was a 61% chance 
of detecting a small effect size.   
4 RESULTS 
It would have been ideal to directly compare the complete data sets from the 
1970s and 21st century, covarying for any differences between the two samples in age, 
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IQ, and other relevant demographic variables.  However, because the raw data from the 
1970s study physically deteriorated and no longer exists, such comparison was not 
possible.  Comparison analyses, therefore, were limited to the information and statistics 
reported in Grisso’s (1981) publication.  In this work, most information on youth 16 years 
of age and younger was reported in a separate series of analyses from those of youth ages 
17 through 19, who were tested as part of an adult sample.  In addition, not all of the 
information reported on youth 16 years of age and younger is available for youth ages 17 
through 19.  Consequently, we limited many analyses of the 21st century sample to 
participants 16 years of age and younger to allow for comparison with results found in 
the 1970s study.  In these cases, for completeness, results for the entire 21st century 
sample (youth 19 years of age and younger) are included in footnotes.  However, if not 
otherwise noted, analyses included all participants 19 years of age and younger.    
The instruments in the MRCI-II include a fifth prong of the Miranda warning.  In 
addition to the items included in Grisso’s original instruments, the CMR-II contains one 
additional item, the CMR-R-II contains three additional questions, and the CMV-II 
contains 12 additional words.  The analyses in this study include only the items that 
appear in both Grisso’s original instruments and in the MRCI-II in order to allow for a 
direct comparison of scores. 
Although a Bonferroni correction would be used in most cases to control for the 
risk of Type 1 error associated with the multiple analyses used to evaluate many of the 
hypotheses listed below, no correction was used.  Because the null hypothesis was 
expected, it is more conservative not to adjust the alpha level. 
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4.1 Analysis of Preliminary Hypotheses 
 Prior to conducting analyses to evaluate hypotheses of interest, we compared 
testing sites to evaluate whether there were key differences that might impact the 
interpretability of results.  A one-way ANOVA was used to compare the average age of 
participants at each of the three testing centers.  We expected the average age at one of 
the PA centers to be lower because this center was only used in the last two years of data 
collection, after most of the older participants needed for the study had participated.  As 
predicted, a significant difference was found between the 3 testing centers (F(2, 181) = 
6.50, p = .002, np2 = .07, medium effect size) (see Table 2).  For this reason, a  
MANCOVA, covarying for age, was used to evaluate all hypotheses comparing the three 
centers.   
To test whether participants from the three testing centers differed significantly on  
Miranda comprehension (CMR-II, CMR-R-II, CMV-II, and FRI scores) and intelligence 
(VIQ scores), a one-way MANCOVA was conducted, controlling for age.  Previous 
research has shown that verbal IQ is associated with Miranda comprehension and that 
scores on the individual Miranda comprehension instruments are correlated (Grisso, 
1981; Colwell, Cruise, Guy, McCoy, Fernandez & Ross, 2005); therefore, all five scores 
were entered into the MANCOVA simultaneously as dependant variables.  As predicted, 
no significant main effect was found for testing center on CMR-R-II, CMV-II, FRI or 
verbal intelligence scores [CMR-R-II: F(2, 154) = 1.52, p = .223, ηp2  = .02, small effect 
size; CMV-II: F(2, 154) = .025, p = .975, ηp2 = .00, sub-small effect size; FRI: F(2, 154) 
= 1.06, p = .35, ηp2 = .014, sub-small effect size; and VIQ: F(2, 154) = .922, p = .40, ηp2 
=.012, small effect size] (see Table 2).  Testing center was significantly associated with 
CMR-II scores [CMR-II: F(2, 154) = 3.23, p = .04, ηp2 = .04, small effect size]   
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A 3 (testing center: MA center, PA center 1, PA center 2) x 2 (ethnicity: minority, 
non-minority2) chi-square analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
testing center and ethnicity of participants.  A significant relationship was found between 
testing center and ethnicity (χ2(2, N = 168) = 15.68, p < .001, V2 = .028)3 (see Table 3).  
Of the 55 participants from the MA testing center, 65% (36) were from an ethnic 
minority group.  At the two PA testing centers, however, minority youth represented 90% 
(87) and 94% (15) of the respective samples.   
Another 3 (testing center: MA center, PA center 1, PA center 2) x 2 (special 
education referral: yes, no) chi-square analysis was conducted to examine the relationship 
between testing center and history of placement in special education.  A significant 
relationship was found between these variables (χ2(2, N = 167) = 12.35, p = .002, V2 = 
.074) (see Table 3).  Fifty-five percent of youth from the MA center reported having 
participated in special education; however, only 27% of the youth from each of the PA 
testing centers reported a history of special education.  Because it is known that males are 
referred to special education services almost twice as often as girls (Vardill, 1996; Wright 
& Payne, 1979; see Wehmeyer & Schwartz 2001 for explanation of reasons for 
differential referral rates), and the youth tested at the MA center were all male, a second 
3(testing center: MA center, PA center 1, PA center 2) x 2 (special education referral: 
yes, no) chi-square analysis was conducted using only the data from the male participants 
                                                 
2 Ethnicity was categorized as minority or non-minority for this analysis because of the small numbers of 
non-African-American minority youth at each of the testing centers. 
3 Including only Caucasian and African-American participants, for consistency with Grisso’s analyses, a 3 
(testing center: MA center, PA center 1, PA center 2) x 2 (ethnicity: African-American, Caucasian) chi-
square analysis revealed a similar relationship between ethnicity and testing center (χ2(2, N=116) = 36.48, p 
< .001, V2 = .315).  
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at each testing center. The significant relationship between testing center and special 
education referral remained (χ2(2, N = 125) = 6.79, p = .034, V2 = .369).   
Two one-way ANCOVAs, covarying age, were used to compare the average 
number of arrests and previous DHS commitments at each of the three testing centers.  
No significant differences were found in number of arrests (F(2, 163) = 2.56, p = .080, 
ηp2 = .03, small effect size); however a significant difference was observed between the 
three testing centers in number of previous DHS commitments (F(2,164)= 4.11, p = .018, 
ηp2 = .05, small effect size ) (see Table 1) with more previous commitments at the MA 
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Table 2 
Miranda Comprehension and Verbal IQ by Testing Center: Means and Standard 
Deviations. 
 Testing Center
 MA center 
(males only) 
n = 55 
PA center 1 
n = 112 
 
PA center 2 
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Table 3 
 
Ethnicity and History of Special Education Referral by Testing Center 
 Testing Center
 MA center PA center 1 PA center 2 Total 





































As predicted based on the 1970s findings, a one-way MANOVA revealed no 
significant differences between the Miranda comprehension and verbal IQ scores of male 
and female participants in the 21st century sample [CMR-II:  F(1, 156) = 1.15, p = .29, ηp2 
= .007, sub-small effect size; CMR-R-II:  F(1, 156) = 2.92, p = .089,  ηp2 = .018, small 
effect size; CMV-II:  F(1, 156) = 1.16, p = ..28, ηp2 = .007, sub-small effect size; FRI:  
F(1, 156) = 0.26, p = .61, ηp2= .002, sub-small effect size]. 
Because raw data from the 1970s study no longer exists, it was not possible to run 
a series of independent samples t-tests or ANVOAs/MANOVAs to compare the ages, IQ 
scores, and number of previous arrests of the two samples.  Hand calculations of 
independent samples t-tests were limited because standard deviations were not reported 
for participants ages 17 through 19 in the 1970s sample.  Therefore, for consistency, 
comparisons between the two samples were calculated by entering the means reported in 
Grisso’s (1981) work as the test value in a series of single-sample t-tests.  The use of 
single-sample t-tests allowed the individual scores of participants in the 21st century 
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sample to be included in the analyses; however it does not take into account the standard 
deviation of the 1970s participants’ scores.  When available, independent samples t-tests, 
calculated by hand, using the means and standard deviations from both samples are 
footnoted.  Single and independent t-tests produced similar results in all analyses, 
identifying the same significant differences between the two samples.   
Including only the youth 16 years of age and younger, three single-sample t-tests 
were conducted to examine differences between the 1970s sample and the 21st century 
sample, entering the mean values from the 1970s study as the test value.  Table 3 presents 
the means and standard deviations for the Miranda comprehension scores and 
demographic variables of interest for both the 1970s and 21st century samples.  Results 
revealed a significant difference in age between the 1970s sample and the 21st century 
sample (t(108) = 2.48, p = .015, d = .24, small effect size).  A significant difference was 
also found between the verbal IQ scores of the 1970s sample and the 21st century sample 
(t(103) = -4.84, p < .001, d = .24, small effect size).  The third single-sample t-tests 
revealed a significant difference between the number of previous arrests in the 1970s 
sample and the 21st century samples (t(102) = 2.44, p = .016, d = 2.12, large effect size).   
On average, the youth 16 years-of-age and younger who participated in the 21st century 
study were slightly older, scored lower on measures of verbal IQ, and had been arrested 






                                                 
4 Independent sample t-tests revealed the same significant differences in age (t(538) = -1.98, p = .048), IQ 
(t(533) = 3.34, p < .001), and number of previous arrests (t(532) = -2.12, p = .034). 
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Table 4 
 
Scores on the Miranda Instruments and Demographic Variables of Interest by Sample 
(1970s or 21st Century): Means and Standard Deviations 
 1970s Sample 
n= 431 
21st Century Sample 
n= 109 
Participants 16 years of age and younger  
Age 14.55 (1.24) 
 
14.81 (1.08) 








CMR (II) 5.86 (1.85) 
 
5.53 (1.96) 
CMR-R (II) 9.38 (1.76) 
 
9.17 (1.81) 
CMV (II) 7.93 (2.62) 
 
5.70 (2.61) 






n = 54 
21st Century Sample 





















b Standard deviation was not reported (Grisso, 1981) 
c n=66 
 
Three repeated measures t-tests were conducted to determine if scores on the 
Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights differed 
significantly from scores on the Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments-II within 
the 21st century sample.  No significant differences were found between youths’ scores on 
the CMR and CMR-II (t(14) = -1.58, p = .136, d = .30, small effect size), scores on the 
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CMR-R and CMR-R-II (t(14) = -3.07, p = .764, d = .06, small effect size), or scores on the 




Scores on the Two Versions of the Miranda Instruments Within the 21st Century Sample: 
Means and Standard Deviations (n = 15) 
 Instruments for Assessing 
Understanding and 





CMR (II) 6.33 (2.09) 
 
5.67 (2.29) 
CMR-R (II) 9.20 (2.48) 
 
9.07 (1.91) 
CMV (II) 7.60 (2.32) 6.87 (2.83) 
   
 
4.2 Analysis of Primary Hypotheses: Quantitative 
Examining data from participants 16 years of age and younger, four single-sample 
t-tests were conducted to determine if Miranda comprehension scores differed 
significantly between youth in the 1970s and 21st century, entering the mean values from 
the 1970s study as the test value.  Results revealed no significant differences between 
scores on the CMR and CMR-II (t(108) = -1.75, p = .084, d = .17, sub-small effect size),  
scores on the CMR-R and CMR-R-II (t(108) = -1.24, p = .219, d = .12, sub-small effect 
size), or scores on the FRI (t(101) = -1.66, p < .10, d = .16, sub-small effect size).  
Significant differences were found between the two samples on the CMV and CMV-II 
(t(108) = -8.92, p < .001, d = .85, large effect size).  Table 4 presents the means and 
standard deviations of Miranda scores for both samples.  Youth from the 1970s study, 
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who were 16 years of age and younger, scored significantly higher on the CMV than did 
same age youth in the 21st century. 
The Miranda scores of youth ages 17 through 19 were compared in the same 
manner, entering mean scores from the 1970s sample as the test value, in a series of three 
single-sample t-tests [Grisso (1981) did not report a mean CMR-R score for youth ages 17 
through 19].  Results revealed significant differences in scores between the two samples 
on the CMR and CMR-II (t(72) = -3.86, p < .001, d = .45, small effect size), CMV and 
CMV-II (t(72) = -7.25, p < .001, d = .85, large effect size), and the FRI (t(66) = -6.35, p < 
.001, d = .78, large effect size).  Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of 
Miranda comprehension scores for 17 through 19 year olds in the 21st century sample, 
and the mean scores of same aged participants in the 1970s sample [Grisso (1981) 
reported no standard deviations for this age group]. 
Fourteen chi-square analyses were performed to examine if the level of observed 
understanding of each item on the CMR-II, each prong on the CMR-R-II, and each item 
on the CMV-II differed significantly from the expected level of understanding, based on 
the results of the 1970s study5.  Only youth 16 years of age and younger were included in 
these analyses because Grisso (1981) did not report these scores for 17 through 19 year 
olds.  The 1970s and 21st century samples obtained significantly different frequencies of 
adequate, questionable, and inadequate understanding on all four questions of the CMR 
(1. Right to silence: χ2(1, N = 109) = 206.86, p < .001; 2. Statement will be used in court: 
χ2(2, N = 109) = 23.30, p < .001; 3. Right to attorney before and during questioning: χ2(2, 
N = 109) = 48.05, p < .001; 4. Right to appointed attorney: χ2(2, N = 109) = 18.18, p < 
                                                 
5 To calculate the expected values, the observed frequencies from the 1970s sample of 431 youths were 
transformed to be proportionally equivalent to a sample of 109 youths, the number of youths in the 21st 
century study.  
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.001), and all four subtests of the CMR-R6 (1: χ2(2, N = 109) = 12.85, p = .002; 2: χ2(1, N 
= 109) = 7.27, p = .007; 3: χ2(2, N = 109) = 7.37, p = .025; 4: χ2(2, N = 109) = 30.36, p < 
.001).  Significant differences were also found in scores between the 21st century and 
1970s samples on five of the six vocabulary words included in both the CMV and CMV-II 
(consult: χ2(2, N = 109) = 46.24, p < .001; attorney: χ2(2, N = 109) = 23.43, p < .001; 
entitled: χ2(2, N = 109) = 133.27, p < .001; appoint: χ2(2, N = 109) = 63.01, p < .001; 
right: χ2(2, N = 109) = 40.04, p < .001).  Interrogation was the only item on which the two 
samples did not differ significantly (χ2(2, N = 109) = 2.46, p = .293).  Table 6 presents the 
percentage of youth in the 1970s and 21st century samples who scored adequately, 
questionably, and inadequately on each item.    
Table 6   
 
Percentage of Sample at Each Level of Understanding. 
 Level of Understanding 
 Adequate Questionable Inadequate 
CMR (II)    
Right to Silence 
   1970s a  










Statement will be used 
in court 
1970s a  













Right to attorney 
before and during 
questioning 
1970s a  
















Right to appointed 
attorney 
1970s a  













                                                 
6 When analyzing CMR-R and CMR-R-II scores, scores of 0 (inadequate) and 1 (questionable) were 
collapsed into a single category (less than adequate) because of the low expected and observed counts in 
these cells that would have prevented the use of chi square analysis. 
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CMV (II) Adequate Questionable Inadequate 
Consult 
1970s a  











1970s a  











1970s a  











1970s a  











1970s a  











1970s a  













 3 2 1 0 
CMR-R (II)     
Right to Silence 
   1970s c  













Statement will be used 
in court 
1970s c  

















Right to attorney 
before and during 
questioning 
1970s c  





















Right to appointed 
attorney 
1970s c  

















* Scores collapsed into a singe “less than adequate” category. 
a n = 431 
b n = 109 
c n = 105 
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These results provide some description and explanation of the significant 
differences observed, and not observed, in the t-test analyses.  The relationship between 
the two samples was varied on the CMR.  It seems that 21st century youth are better able 
to understand and explain the third prong of the Miranda warning than their counterparts 
in the 1970s.  Youth today also seem to have made progress in their understanding of the 
second prong.  Fewer youth in the 21st century sample received scores of “inadequate” on 
the second prong of the CMR than in the 1970s study, and many more 21st century 
participants fell in the “questionable range.”  Youth today seem to have worse 
understanding, however, of the first and fourth prongs of the warning.  Three times more 
21st century youth showed inadequate understanding of the first prong of the warning 
than would be expected based on the 1970s results.  On the CMV-II, consistently fewer 
than expected numbers of youth exhibited adequate understanding.  Proportionally more 
youth in the 21st century study show inadequate Miranda comprehension based on CMV 
and CMR-R  scores.  At the same time, CMR-II scores revealed that a smaller percentage 
of the 21st century study received inadequate scores on one or more items.  The 
percentage of youth obtaining zero-credit, or “inadequate” scores on one or more items in 
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Table 7  
Percentage of Youth Receiving “Inadequate” Scores 
 1970s Sample 21st Century Sample 
CMR (II) 
Obtained “Inadequate” Score on 
  
One item 36.2 20.2 
Two items 12.8 12.8 
Three items 4.4 5.5 
Four items 1.9 .9 
One or more items 55.3 39.4 
CMV (II) 
Obtained “Inadequate” Score on 
  
One item 29.9 21.1 
Two items 19.3 15.6 
Three items 7.7 26.6 
Four items 3.0 13.8 
Five items 3.0 5.5 
Six items 0.5 1.8 
One or more items 63.3 84.4 
 
In his analysis of the 1970s study, Grisso (1981) reported Pearson correlations of 
age and IQ (the two factors he found to correlate most with Miranda comprehension 
scores) with scores on the CMR, CMR-R, and CMV.  He also reported the partial 
correlations of age and IQ with scores on the CMR, CMR-R, and CMV while controlling 
for the combination of age, ethnicity and IQ.  He reported correlations and partial 
correlations only for youth 16 years of age and younger; thus, all analyses of the 21st 
century sample were also limited to participants 16 years of age and younger.  To allow 
for comparison, we calculated Pearson correlations between Miranda comprehension 
scores (on the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and CMV-II) and the variables we thought might be 
associated with Miranda comprehension, based on previous research (ethnicity, number 
of arrests, number of previous DHS detentions, age, and verbal IQ).   
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Verbal IQ correlated significantly with all three measures of Miranda 
comprehensions (p < .001).  The number of previous detentions correlated significantly 
with CMV-II scores (p = .005).  Age was not significantly associated with any Miranda 
comprehension score.  In the 1970s sample Grisso (1981) observed Pearson correlations 
ranging from .22 to .44 between age and Miranda comprehension.  In today’s sample, 
Pearson correlations ranged from .13 to .18.  See Table 8 for all obtained correlations. 
 For consistency with the 1970s analyses, we calculated five partial correlation 
equations; in each, we examined the relationship between Miranda comprehension scores 
and one of the following five potential predictor variables: ethnicity, number of arrests, 
number of previous DHS detentions, age, and Verbal IQ; the other four variables served 
as control variables in the equation.  Once controlling for the other four predictor 
variables, the number of previous detentions was no longer significantly associated with 
CMV-II scores, but it was significantly related to CMR-R-II scores (p = .020).  Verbal IQ 
remained significantly associated with all three measures of Miranda comprehension (p < 
.001), and the relationships between age and CMR-II scores (p = .019) and age and CMV-
II scores (p = .048) emerged as significant.  Table 9 presents the partial correlation 
values.  
 Although partial correlations were calculated to allow for comparison with the 
1970s sample, the preferred method of analyzing this hypothesis would be to use a 
multiple regression equation, examining one predictor variable while controlling for each 
of the others.  When CMR-II scores were simultaneously regressed on all five predictor 
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variables7, only age (p = .027) and Verbal IQ (p < .001) were significantly associated 
with CMR-II scores.  When CMR-R-II scores were simultaneously regressed on all five 
predictor variables simultaneously, both number of previous DHS detentions (p = .012) 
and Verbal IQ (p < .001) were significantly associated with CMR-R-II scores.  When 
CMV-II scores were simultaneously regressed on all five predictor variables, only Verbal 
IQ (p < .001) was significantly associated with CMV-II scores.  See Table 10 for b, SEb, 
and p values.  Table 11 presents the percent of variance in CMR and CMV accounted for 
by IQ, age, and ethnicity in both the 1970s and 21st century samples8.   
Table 8  
Pearson r Correlations of Demographic Characteristics and Miranda Comprehension 
Scores for Youth ages 13 through 16 




Number of Arrests .15 
 
.18 .08 









Verbal IQ .49*** .54*** .40*** 




                                                 
7 In all multiple regression analyses, ethnicity was dummy coded. African-American youth were chosen as 
the baseline for comparison because they represented the largest proportion of youth in the 21st century 
sample.   
8 These values are reported to allow for comparison with Grisso’s 1970s analyses; however, it is important 
to note that calculations of this type assign all variance shared by the predictor variables to the first variable 
entered, in this case IQ, and, as such, may overestimate the contribution of IQ as a predictor (King, 1986). 
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Table 9     
Partial Correlations of Demographic Variables and Miranda Comprehension Scores for 
Youth ages 13 through 16 
 CMR-II CMR-R-II CMV-II 
1. Ethnicity 





2. Number of Arrests 





3. Number of Previous DHS 
commitments 












5. Verbal IQ 
(controlling for predictors 1,2,3 and 4) 
.54*** .45*** .56*** 
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Table 10    
 
Results of Regressing Miranda Scores on Demographic Characteristics for Youth ages 13 
through 16 
 CMR-II CMR-R-II CMV-II 
Age b = .376 
SEb = .17 
p = .03 
b = .28 
SEb = .16 
p = .08 
b = .35 
SEb = .21 




b = -.22 
SEb = 1.22 
p = .87 
 
b = 1.29 
SEb = 1.15 
p = .27 
 
b = -.19 
SEb = 1.51 




b = .54 
SEb = .48 
p = .26 
 
b = -.20 
SEb = .45 
p = .67 
 
b = .19 
SEb = .59 
p = .75 
 
Hispanic or Latino 
 
b = .15 
SEb = .53 
p = .78 
 
b = .67 
SEb = .50 
p = .19 
 
b = -.46 
SEb = .66 
p = .49 
 
Other or Unknown 
 
b = .57 
SEb = .64 
p = .38 
 
b = -.27 
SEb = .60 
p = .64 
 
b = .49 
SEb = .79 
p = .54 
 
Number of Arrests 
 
b = .02 
SEb = .07 
p = .79 
 
b = .10 
SEb = .07 
p = .14 
 
b = -.05 
SEb = .09 
p = .56 
 
Number of Previous 
DHS detentions 
 
b = -.04 
SEb = .09 
p = .63 
 
 
b = -.22 
SEb = .08 
p = .01 
 
b = .17 
SEb = .11 




b = .09 
SEb = .02 
p < .001 
 
 
b = .07 
SEb = .02 
p < .001 
 
b = .12 
SEb = .02 
p < .001 
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Table 11 
 
Variance in CMR and CMV Scores Accounted for by IQ, Age, and Ethnicity 
 
 1970s Sample  21st Century Sample 
Variable Multiple R Cumulative 
% of Variance 
Multiple R Cumulative 
% of Variance 
CMR     
IQ .498 .248 .504 .254 
Age .541 .292 .553 .306 
Ethnicity .558 .311 .565 .320 
CMV     
IQ .613 .376 .568 .323 
Age .714 .510 .596 .355 
Ethnicity .723 .523 .604 .364 
 
A slightly different relationship between predictor variables and Miranda 
comprehensions scores was seen when all participants (youth 13 through 19 years of age) 
were included in analyses.  Verbal IQ correlated significantly with all three Miranda 
comprehension scores (p < .01).  The number of arrests correlated significantly with 
CMR-II scores (p = .01), and both the number of arrests and number of previous 
detentions correlated significantly with CMV-II scores (p = .02).  Age was not 
significantly correlated with any Miranda comprehension scores.  See Table 12 for all 
obtained correlations. 
When we calculated partial correlation equations for each of the five predictor 
variables, with the other four predictors serving as control variables, the number of 
previous detentions and the number of arrests were no longer significantly associated 
with Miranda comprehension scores.  Age, however, was significantly related to scores 
on all three instruments (CMR-II: p = .010; CMR-R-II: p = .010; CMV-II:  p < .001).  
Verbal IQ was also significantly associated with all three measures of Miranda 
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comprehension (CMR-II:  p < .001; CMR-R-II:  p < .001; CMV-II:  p < .001).  Table 13 
presents the partial correlations.   
Similar results were found when Miranda  comprehension scores were regressed 
on the predictor variables.  Of the demographic variables entered, only age and Verbal IQ 
were significantly associated with Miranda comprehension scores.  Both were 
significantly associated with all three measures of comprehension (p ≤ .01).  See Table 14 
for b, SEb, and p values.   
 
Table 12 
Pearson r Correlations of Demographic Variables and Miranda Comprehension Scores 
for Youth age 13 through 19. 




Number of Arrests .20** 
 
.15 .18* 









Verbal IQ .52** .48** .56** 
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Table 13 
 
Partial Correlations of Demographic Variables and Miranda Comprehension Scores for 
Youth ages 13 through 19. 
 CMR-II CMR-R-II CMV-II 
1. Ethnicity 





2. Number of Arrests 





3. Number of Previous DHS 
commitments 












5. Verbal IQ 
(controlling for predictors 1,2,3 and 4) 
.58*** .49*** .60*** 
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Table 14 
 
Results of Regressing Miranda scores on demographic characteristics for Youth ages 13 
through 19. 
 CMR-II CMR-R-II CMV-II 
Age b = .21 
SEb = .08 
p = .01 
b = .20 
SEb = .08 
p = .01 
b = .37 
SEb = .11 





b = .13 
SEb = .96 
p = .90 
 
 
b = .72 
SEb = .93 
p = .44 
 
b = -.78 
SEb = 1.26 
p = .53 
Caucasian b = .43 
SEb = .36 
p = .23 
 
b = -.24 
SEb = .35 
p = .49 
b = -.05 
SEb = .47 
p = .92 
Hispanic b = .20 
SEb = .37 
p = .59 
 
b = .08 
SEb = .36 
p = .83 
b = -.12 
SEb = .49 
p = .81 
Other b = .71 
SEb = .45 
p = .11 
 
b = -.01 
SEb = .43 
p = .97 
b = -.12 
SEb = .59 
p = .84 
Number of Arrests b = .07 
SEb = .05 
p = .12 
 
b = .08 
SEb = .04 
p = .09 
b = .05 
SEb = .06 
p = .36 
Number of Previous 
DHS detentions 
b = -.04 
SEb = .06 
p = .52 
 
b = -.08 
SEb = .05 
p = .13 
b = .04 
SEb = .08 
p = .59 
Verbal IQ b = .09 
SEb = .01 
p < .001 
 
b = .076 
SEb = .01 
p < .001 
b = .13 
SEb = .02 
p < .001 
 
 
A 7 (age; 13 through 19) x 5 (IQ level; 70 and below, 71-80, 81-90, 91-100, 101 
and above) ANOVA was conducted to examine the relationship between age, IQ, and 
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CMR-II scores to compare relationships with those obtained in the 1970s.  Results 
confirmed the expected main effects for age (F(6, 110) = 2.35, p = .036) and verbal IQ 
(F(4,110) = 15.95, p < .001).  In the 1970s study, a significant interaction was observed 
between age and IQ; no significant interaction was found in the 21st century sample 
(F(19,110) = .915, p = .566). 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in IQ by age group 
(F(7,163) = 1.40, p = .208).  Post-hoc analysis of the main effect for age on CMR-II 
scores was conducted using Duncan’s Multiple Range Test, the very conservative test 
used in the 1970s study to examine differences between age groups.  No significant 
differences were seen between the CMR-II scores of different ages (p = .06).  In order to 
explore any differences that might exist between the age groups, groups were also 
compared using a less conservative Sidak correction.  Still, no significant differences 
were seen between the age groups (p ≥ .65), with mean differences ranging from 0.02 to 
1.2.   
 Although Grisso (1981) did not report the significance of differences in CMR-II 
scores observed between the IQ ranges in the 1970s sample, the differences observed in 
the 21st century sample were explored.  Duncan’s Multiple Range Test, used by Grisso 
for other post-hoc comparisons, revealed no significant differences between IQ ranges on 
CMR-II scores.  A less conservative Sidak correction, however, revealed that CMR-II 
scores of the youth scoring both 70 or below and between 71 and 80 differed significantly 
from scores produced by youth in all other IQ ranges (p ≤ .03).  CMR-II scores of youth 
with IQs in the ranges of 81-90, 91-100, and greater than or equal to 101 did not differ 
significantly from one another (p ≥ .86).   See Figure 1 for CMR-II means by age and 
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verbal IQ in the 21st century sample.  Figure 2 illustrates the relationship observed in the 
1970s sample.  See Table 13 for the number of 21st century youth within each age and 
verbal IQ level.  Only those levels with three or more participants were included in 




Number of 21st Century Youth at Each Age and IQ Range 
IQ Classification 
Age ≤ 70 71-80 81-90 91-100 101+ Total 
13 0 2 3 0 3 8 
14 3 9 3 3 1 19 
15 4 7 9 4 2 26 
16 8 8 11 5 1 33 
17 4 11 7 6 1 29 
18 3 6 4 0 0 13 
19 5 3 3 0 1 12 
Total 27 46 40 18 9 140 
 
Figure 1.    21st Century CMR-II  Scores by Age and IQ 
(Ages 13 through 19)
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Figure 2.  1970s CMR  Scores by Age and IQ

























A 7(age; 13 through 19 years) x 5(IQ level; 70 and below, 71-80, 81-90, 91-100, 101 
and above) ANOVA was conducted to examine the relationship between age, IQ, and 
CMV-II scores to see if relationships corresponded to those from the 1970s.  Results 
revealed the expected main effect for verbal IQ (F(4, 110) = 21.92, p < .001) but did not 
support the proposed main effect of age (F(6, 110) = 1.61, p = .151).  Because the age 
groups did not differ significantly in their scores on the CMV-II, no post hoc analyses 
were conducted.   
As with CMR-II scores, when the CMV-II scores of the different IQ ranges were 
compared using a conservative Duncan’s Multiple Range Test, no significant differences 
were revealed.  When a less conservative Sidak correction was used, a relationship 
similar to that seen between IQ and CMR-II scores appeared.  Youth scoring 70 or below, 
and those scoring between 71 and 80 differed significantly from scores produced by 
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youth in all other IQ ranges (p ≤ .002).  CMV-II scores of youth with IQs in the ranges of 
81-90, 91-100, and less than or equal to 101 did not differ significantly from one another 
(p ≥ .48).  See Figure 3 for CMV-II means by age and verbal IQ in the 21st century 
sample.  Figure 4 illustrates the relationship observed in the 1970s study.   
 
Figure 3.    21st Century CMV-II  Scores by Age and IQ
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Figure 4.  1970s CMV  Scores by Age and IQ






















As expected, verbal IQ was the strongest predictor of Miranda comprehension.  
Significant relationships were seen between verbal IQ and all three measures of Miranda 
comprehension (CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and CMV-II) using correlation, partial correlation, 
and regression analyses.  Results were consistent in analyses using youth ages 13 through 
19 and with only those youth ages 13 through 16 (to parallel Grisso’s analyses).  Youth 
with verbal IQ scores between 71 and 80 scored significantly lower on the CMR-II and 
CMV-II than did youth with verbal IQ scores of 81 and above.  Youth with verbal IQ 
scores below 70 scored significantly lower than all other youth on both measures.  Across 
all ages, less than half of youth scoring between 71 and 80, and less than one-fourth of 
youth scoring below 70, achieved “adequate” levels of understanding on all prongs of the 
CMR-II.  Across all ages, less than half of participants at each IQ level exhibited 
“adequate” understanding of all 6 Miranda vocabulary words.  Across IQ levels, the 
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portion of participants with “adequate” understanding of all six words ranged from  4% 
of those with verbal IQ scores below 70, to 44% of those obtaining verbal IQ scores 
above 101.   
Examining data from youth 16 years of age and younger, a 3 (number of arrests: 
1, 2, 3 or more) x 4 (number of previous DHS detentions: 0, 1, 2, 3 or more) MANOVA 
was conducted to evaluate the relationship between previous experience with the police 
and Miranda comprehension.  Results revealed that CMR-II scores were significantly 
associated with the number of times a youth had been arrested, but they did not appear to 
be significantly associated with the number of previous detentions (Times arrested: F(2, 
76) = 4.13, p = .020; Previous detentions: F(3, 76) = 1.68, p = .178).  Although a 
significant relationship was observed, results clearly do not support the assumption that 
increased exposure to the police yields better Miranda comprehension.  Youth with only 
one previous arrest received a mean CMR-II score of 5.7 (SD=1.8), whereas youth with 
two prior arrests received a mean score of 5.0 (SD=2.4), and those with three or more 
previous arrests received a mean score of 5.8 (SD=1.7).    
Scores on the CMV-II were not significantly associated with the number of times 
arrested (F(2, 76) = 1.76, p = .756) or the number of previous detentions (F(3, 76) = .474, 
p = .702).  Using a 3 (number of arrests: 1, 2, 3 or more) x 4 (number of previous DHS 
detentions: 0, 1, 2, 3 or more) x 5 (ethnicity: Asian, Black or African-American, White, 
Hispanic or Latino, Other) MANOVA, ethnicity was examined as a potential moderator 
of the relationship between previous experience and Miranda comprehension.  Results 
revealed that neither scores on the CMR-II nor CMV-II were significantly associated with 
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ethnicity (CMR-II: F(4, 60) = .883, p = .480; CMV-II: F(4, 60) = .395, p = .811)9, nor the 
interactions between ethnicity and the variables measuring experience with the legal 
system (Previous detentions x ethnicity: CMR-II; F(8, 60) = .997, p = .448, CMV-II: F(8, 
60) = 1.31, p = .255; Number of arrests x ethnicity: CMR-II: F(4, 60) = .861, p = .493; 
CMV-II: F(4, 60) = .309, p = .871).   
Similar results were found using a 3 (number of arrests: 1, 2, 3 or more) x 4 
(number of previous DHS detentions: 0, 1, 2, 3 or more) x 2 (ethnicity: Black or African-
American, White) MANOVA, an analysis designed to parallel the analyses used in the 
1970s study.  Again, neither number of previous detentions (CMR-II: F(3, 50) = .501, p = 
.683; CMV-II:  F(3, 50) = 1.16, p = .334), number of arrests (CMR-II: F(2, 50) = .391, p 
= .679; CMV-II:  F(2, 50) = .188, p = .829), ethnicity (CMR-II: F(1, 50) = .223, p = .639; 
CMV-II:  F(1, 50) = .447, p = .507), nor the interactions between ethnicity and the legal 
experience variables (Previous detentions x ethnicity: CMR-II: F(2, 50) = .284, p = .754; 
CMV-II: F(2, 50) = 1.03, p = .364; Number of arrests x ethnicity: CMR-II: F(1, 50) = 
.564, p = .456; CMV-II: F(1, 50) = .080, p = .778) related significantly to either CMR-II 
or CMV-II scores. 
4.3 Primary Hypotheses: Descriptive 
Because of the limited descriptive information reported from the 1970s study, 
only youth 16 years of age and younger were included in our descriptive analyses.  We 
expected that when youth in the 21st century sample misunderstood aspects of the 
Miranda warning, they would make errors similar to those of their counterparts in the 
                                                 
9 When all participants (youth 19 years of age and younger) were included in the MANCOVA similar 
results were obtained.  Scores on the CMR-II and CMV-II were not significantly associated with the number 
of previous arrests, number of previous DHS detentions, ethnicity, nor the interactions between ethnicity 
and the variables measuring experience with the legal system. 
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1970s.  Thus, on the CMR-II, we expected that youth would misinterpret the first prong 
of the Miranda warning (right to silence) as a statement that one must be silent.  The 
expected pattern of errors was seen in youths’ responses on the CMR-II.  Youth who 
received inadequate or questionable scores on this question most often misinterpreted the 
warning as a statement to be quiet, frequently believing that it meant that a suspect must 
be quiet and not talk.  See Table 14 for categories of misunderstanding and sample 
responses.   
When the second prong of the Miranda warning (statements will be used in court) 
was misunderstood in the 1970s, it was interpreted most often to mean that any lying or 
disobedience could result in negative consequences in court.  Responses did not include 
the recognition that truthful statements that may be self-incriminating could also be used 
against the defendant in court.  As expected, youth in the 21st century sample, with 
questionable or inadequate comprehension of the second prong of the Miranda warning, 
most often misinterpreted the statement to mean that their bad behaviors (e.g., lying, 
cursing) could be brought up in court and used as a basis for punishment.  These youth 
did not express an understanding that truthful statements about the offense could also be 
used against them in court.  The second most common, and related, misunderstanding 
was the recognition that information could be repeated in court, but with no 
understanding that this information would be used in an adversarial process to 
incriminate the youth.  
In the 1970s sample, when the third prong of the Miranda warning (right to an 
attorney before and during interrogations) was misunderstood, the time and place an 
attorney could be obtained was unclear or unspecified (even after querying from the 
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examiner).  Youth in the 21st century sample who exhibited questionable or inadequate 
understanding of the third prong of the Miranda warning also tended to lack an 
understanding of when an attorney could be obtained.  Even when asked by the examiner, 
“Does this sentence tell you a certain time when you can have a lawyer?” youth did not 
understand when a defendant could request an attorney.  Youth tended to report that a 
lawyer could be requested before police interrogation or that a lawyer could be with them 
during interrogation; they did not express an understanding that a lawyer would be 
available to them at both time points.  Many youth also misinterpreted the statement to 
mean that they would automatically have a lawyer with them in court, but made no 




Categories of Misunderstandings and Sample Responses from the 1970s and 21st Century  
 
  Grisso’s 1970s Sample 21st Century Sample 






(Percentage of Total Sample 




1.  Right to Silence 
 
 
 You must be silent  “You have to 
remain silent” 
One must be silent 
(26%) 
“You got to be quiet” 
 ---- ---- One has the option of 
silence, without 
understanding that a 
right is protected (6%) 
“You can, if you 
want, remain silent” 
2.  Statement will be used in Court 
 
  
 Lying or 
disobedience can 
result in negative 
consequences  
---- Negative behaviors can 
lead to trouble (18%) 
 
“if you threaten or 
say anything crazy 
it can be brought 
back up” 
 ---- ---- Information will be “If you say 
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something they could 
give you a new 
charge” 
 




 The time and place 
an attorney can be 
obtained was 
unclear 
---- One can meet with a 
lawyer before 
questioning (25%) 
“You can have your 
lawyer with you 
before they question 
you” 
 ---- ---- One can have a lawyer 
present during 
questioning (19%) 
“I can have lawyer 
with me when I 
answer questions” 




 A court hearing --- Unable to give a 
definition (33%) 
“Don’t know” 
 Unable to give a 
definition 
--- A negative or violent 








 To converse, 
without the notion 
of assistance or 
advice 
“To talk to” To talk to, without the 
idea of aid or advice 
(22%) 
“You want to say 
something to him” 






 Something one can 
do, without the 
understanding that 
a right is protected. 
“It’s up to you, if 
you want to do it 
you can do it” 
Something one can 
choose to do, without 
the understanding that a 
right is protected. 
(46%) 
“An option if I want 
to do it” 
“You have the option, 
if you want” 
 ---- ---- A privilege, without the 
understanding that the 
privilege is protected 
(5%) 
“the privilege to do 
something” 
FRI     
RC-4.  Why would Tim’s lawyer want to know   
exactly what he did? 
 
  
 Lawyer is required “so he can say it To report information “So he can say it to 
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to report to the 
court any evidence 
of a client’s 
responsibility (3/5) 
in court, because 
it’s his job to tell 
the court that Tim 
did it, if he did 
the crime” 
to the court or judge 
(17%) 
the judge to get him 
locked up” 
 ---- ---- To see if Tim is guilty 
with no explanation of 
why the lawyer would 
want to know this (7%) 
“want to know if he 






RS-5.  Will Greg have to talk about what he    
did wrong in court? 
 
  
 The judge has the 
power to force 
Greg to talk about 
the crime, with 
some indication 
that the judge can 
punish Greg if he 
does not. 
“If I’m in court, I 
have to tell the 
truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing 
but the truth.  So 
when the judge 
asks you what 
you done, you got 
to tell him even if 
you don’t want 
to.” 
Greg must talk about 
what he did when in 
court, with no 
explanation of why, 
despite querying (27%) 
“Yes” 
 ---- ---- The judge has authority 
to make Greg talk 
about what he did 
(21%) 
“Yes, he can’t say no 
to a judge” 
 
Note.  Grisso (1981) only reported the most common misunderstandings for these items.  
For consistency, the two most common misunderstandings in the 21st century sample are 
listed 
 
In the 1970s sample, juveniles commonly misinterpreted Warning III on the 
CMR-R, believing that a social worker was synonymous with an attorney.  Similarly, 
more than half of the youth in the 21st century sample interpreted the appointment of a 
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social worker as synonymous with the appointment of an attorney.  Youth did not 
distinguish the difference in the roles played by these two categories of professionals. 
On the CMV, youth in the 1970s sample either mistakenly defined “interrogation” 
as a court hearing or were unable to give a definition.  Similarly, more than half of 
participants in the 21st century sample who exhibited questionable or inadequate 
understanding of the word “interrogation” were unable to give any definition of the word.  
Of those that gave a response, they most commonly defined interrogation as a negative 
situation in which an individual would be attacked (e.g., argument, assault, pressure, 
harassment), or as a meeting in which they would consult someone. 
As in the 1970s study, 21st century youth most often misinterpreted the word 
“consult” as talking to someone, without the express purpose of seeking advice or input.  
The second most common misinterpretation was to define “consult” as “confront,” with 
little to no elaboration.  The querying procedures for this item did not direct examiners to 
question this response; thus, it is unclear whether youth thought a consultation was an 
adversarial event, as a confrontation would be, or if the similarity in sounds between the 
two words led to their association.     
On the CMV, “right,” was most often defined by youth in the 1970s sample as 
something one can do.  Even with prompting by the examiner, the definition rarely 
included recognition that rights are protected.  As expected, in the 21st century study, 
more than two-thirds of youth who exhibited questionable or inadequate understanding of 
the word, “right,” defined the word to mean something a person can do (e.g., permission, 
allowed), and the definition did not include the important concept of a right as a 
guaranteed protection. 
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For the1970s sample, the most common misconceptions about the reasons 
lawyers seek the truth (item 9 on the Right to Counsel subscale of the FRI) were: that the 
lawyer must report all information to the court (most common), that the lawyer would not 
advocate for a guilty juvenile, and that the lawyer was similar to a judge and would 
decide guilt and/or punishment.  As expected, youth in the 21st century sample who 
exhibited questionable or inadequate understanding of why lawyers seek the truth, stated 
that the lawyer wanted the information in order to report it to the court and/or judge.  The 
second most common misunderstanding was that the lawyer would want to know whether 
or not the youth was guilty.  Youth in the 21st century sample did not seem to think the 
lawyer would decide guilt and/or punishment, just that the lawyer would want to know 
this information about the client.  Youth were unclear in their statements, even after 
querying, about why a lawyer would need such information, simply stating that the 
lawyer would want to know.  It was generally unclear whether youth believed the lawyer 
needed the information to defend the client, to report the information directly to the court, 
to decide whether to take the case, or just for the sake of curiosity. 
A majority of youth in the 1970s sample believed that a suspect must talk about 
an alleged offense if ordered to by the judge (item 15 on the Right to Silence subscale of 
the FRI).  Almost half of the youth in the 21st century sample, and more than 90% of 
those exhibiting inadequate or questionable understanding of this item, reported that a 
suspect must talk about an offense if ordered to by the judge.  Interestingly, half of the 
youth who could adequately define the right to silence on the first item of the CMR-II still 
reported that a suspect must talk about an alleged offense if ordered to by the judge. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Because we could not control for the differences between the two samples, it 
would be overreaching to provide a global interpretation of changes in Miranda 
comprehension over time.  However, it is fair to report that the similarities in Miranda 
comprehension scores between the two samples suggest that Miranda comprehension has 
not notably improved over the past 30 years, as the courts, at times, have assumed.   
Despite being slightly older and having more experience with the police, youth 
today exhibited similar to worse comprehension of the Miranda warning.  The poorer 
comprehension exhibited in the 21st century study suggests that youth today may not 
understand the key vocabulary included in the warnings and may have misconceptions 
that interfere with their more general understanding of some prongs of the warning.  As 
such, youth given the standard warning before interrogation may be in a position similar 
to, if not worse than, their counterparts in the 1970s when asked to make a knowing and 
intelligent waiver decision.    
5.1 Comparing Testing Sites in the 21st Century Sample 
5.1.1 Confirmatory Findings 
 As expected, results indicated no major differences across the three testing centers 
that would prevent the analysis of the sample as a whole.  Youth from the 2nd PA testing 
center were younger, due to recruitment timing.  When controlling for age, youth from 
the three centers exhibited similar numbers of previous arrests, as well as comparable 
verbal IQ, CMR-R-II, CMV-II, and FRI scores.  As hypothesized, we saw no gender 
differences in Miranda comprehension, allowing all analyses to be performed on a 
combined sample of male and female youths. 
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5.1.2 Differences Observed Across Testing Centers 
Scores on the CMR-II varied significantly by site.  These differences may be 
explained by the relatively small sample of youth gathered from one of the PA testing 
centers.  Only 13 youth were tested at this location; therefore, individual scores could 
have had a great deal of influence on the site’s mean and standard deviation.  Because 
there were no consistent differences between centers, and because results did not differ at 
all between the two sites from which most of the sample was collected, differences 
appear to be resulting from the unwarranted influence of individual scores at one testing 
site with few subjects.   
 Ethnicity differences were also observed across centers.  Participants from the two 
PA testing centers were more often members of minority groups.  As a whole, compared 
with juvenile justice averages, the sample was somewhat over-represented by minority 
youth.  Residential juvenile justice facility statistics from 1999 reported that 71% of 
youth in PA state facilities and 75% of youth in MA state facilities were from minority 
ethnic groups (Sickmund, 2004).  In our sample, minority youth made up 82% of the total 
sample (90% PA, 65% MA).  Nationally, black youth have the highest custody rates, and 
it is this group that was the single largest minority group within our sample (47%; 15% 
MA, 60% PA). 
 Significant differences in educational history were also observed across testing 
centers.  More MA youth reported participating in special education services than did 
youth from PA, and these differences were not due to gender differences across testing 
centers.  Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is hypothesized that these 
differences may be due to differing state and county policies, available resources, and 
funding for relevant services.  No differences in IQ were observed across centers; thus, 
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the aptitudes of youth at each testing center were not so systematically different as to 
preclude collapsing data from the 21st century sample.   
 Finally, we observed unexpected differences in the number of previous detentions 
across testing centers.  Youth from the MA post-adjudication center had the most 
previous detentions, followed by youth at the PA detention center, then by youth at the 
PA post-adjudication center.  This finding is surprising and not completely understood.  
At all centers, only adjudicated youth participated.  The differences observed may 
represent the individual differences of the youth at each center or they may reflect 
differences in state policies on which youth remain in detention, post-adjudication.  
Although differences in previous detentions were observed by testing center, it is 
important to note that no differences were seen in the number of previous arrests.  For the 
current study, this is the more relevant demographic variable, as it is more indicative of 
the number of times the youth is likely to have been questioned and read the Miranda 
warning by police.  As such, it is a better estimate of previous experience with police 
interrogation procedures.  In addition, it is the variable that parallels Grisso’s measure of 
legal experience.   
5.2 Comparing Demographic Variables of the 1970s and 21st Century Samples 
 Comparison of the 1970s and 21st century samples’ key demographic variables 
revealed some potentially important differences between the two groups.   
5.2.1 Age and IQ 
The 21st century sample was, on average, slightly younger.  However, although 
significantly different, only a small effect size was observed; the average 21st century 
participant falls at the 58th percentile of the 1970s study.   
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Twenty-first century youth also had lower estimated IQ scores than their 
counterparts in the 1970s.  This difference was, again, small, placing the average 
participant from the 21st century study at the 58th percentile of the 1970s study.  Although 
only a small difference was observed between the two samples, it is important to note that 
the difference observed could be explained by ethnic differences between the two 
samples; on average, minority youth score lower on the Wechsler scales than do 
Caucasian youth (Fagan & Holland, 2002), and minority youth constituted the majority of 
the 21st century sample.   
Alternatively, the observed IQ difference could have resulted from the use of 
different sub-tests to calculate an IQ score in the two samples.  In the 1970s, two verbal 
sub-tests; (Vocabulary and Similarities) and one performance sub-test (Block Design) 
were given.  In the 21st century study, only the two verbal subtests were used.  As such, 
juveniles in the 21st century study with strong performance skills would not have had the 
opportunity to raise their overall scores with their performance scores.  Research has 
shown that delinquent youth are more likely than the general population to obtain 
performance IQ scores higher than verbal IQ scores (Walsh, Petee & Beyer, 1987). 
Although this is a potentially plausible explanation for the observed IQ difference, it 
cannot be verified because the data from the 1970s study no longer exists and verbal IQ 
scores were never presented alone.  Despite the potential problems in comparison, the 
verbal IQ estimates of youth in the 21st century study remain an important factor to 
consider, as verbal abilities are most relevant to Miranda comprehension (Goldstein, 
Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman & Geier, 2003).  Nonetheless, age and IQ differences 
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between the two samples are potentially important, and the Miranda comprehension 
comparisons must be interpreted in light of these differences.   
5.2.2 Previous Experience with the Police  
The most pronounced difference between the two samples was the number of 
previous arrests reported.  This variable was gathered to represent the number of times 
youth had experienced police procedures and, most likely, heard the Miranda warning.  
Although a meaningful proxy of youths’ interactions with police, and a factor noted 
within the “totality of circumstances” test, number of arrests is not synonymous with 
youths’ interrogation experience.  Direct information about youths’ interrogation 
experience (frequency, duration, etc.) was not available for either sample and, thus, the 
proxy data was examined  Youth in the 21st century reported significantly more previous 
arrests than did 1970s youth.  The large effect size of the difference indicates that the 
average 21st century participant would have been at the 97th percentile of the 1970s 
sample.  This difference may or may not affect the comparability of the two samples.   
Based on the differences seen between the two samples, if we apply the logic 
previously used by courts in the “totality of circumstances” test, we would expect 21st 
century youth to have better Miranda comprehension because of their greater experience 
with the legal system.  However, results of the 1970s study did not support the 
relationship between prior experience and Miranda comprehension (Grisso, 1981), and 
such a relationship was not found with the modern sample.  For this reason, it was 
assumed that the differences in number of previous arrests did not preclude the 
comparison of Miranda comprehension in the two samples.   
Miranda Warning Comprehension     92 
5.3 Comparing Grisso’s Original Instruments and the MRCI-II. 
 Results from the sub-sample of youth completing both Grisso’s original 
instruments and the MRCI-II revealed no significant differences in scores on the two 
measures, despite minor differences in wording.  Small effect sizes were found between 
the two measures, with youth scoring consistently higher on Grisso’s; this was even the 
case on the CMV, a measure in which the items were identical to those on the CMV-II.  
Because completion of the MRCI-II was the priority (i.e., to generate norms), participants 
were administered Grisso’s measure after completing the MRCI-II and other study 
measures.  The slightly higher scores on Grisso’s instrument may be the results of a 
practice effect from answering similar questions on the MRCI-II approximately 90 
minutes prior.  
5.4 Comparing Miranda Comprehension in the 1970s and Today 
5.4.1 Confirmatory CMR, CMR-R, and FRI Findings 
 As expected for youth ages 13 through 16, no differences were seen between the 
1970s and 21st century samples on the CMR, CMR-R, and FRI, with sub-small effect 
sizes obtained.  Youth today were no better at describing the meaning of the Miranda 
warnings nor at identifying whether sentences were semantically identical to the Miranda 
prongs.  These findings are especially notable given that 21st century youth had many 
more previous arrests than 1970s youth.  Consistent with Grisso’s (1981) analysis, we 
also found that experience with the police was not associated with better comprehension.     
5.4.2 Differences on the CMV and the FRI for older youths  
 Contrary to expectations, youth ages 13 through 16, in the 21st century sample, 
scored significantly lower on the CMV-II; that is, they were less able to define key words 
from the Miranda warning than were youth in the 1970s.  If the difference in IQ seen 
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between the two samples represents a true intelligence difference, this finding is not 
surprising.  The structure of the CMV is nearly identical to that of the Vocabulary subtest 
of the WISC-R and WASI.  Youth who performed well on the Vocabulary subtest are 
likely to perform well on the CMV.  Although an understanding of the vocabulary 
involved would not be sufficient evidence to indicate Miranda comprehension, 
inadequate understanding of key vocabulary would prohibit adequate Miranda 
comprehension of the broader meaning of the warning.  For example, if a youth does not 
know what an attorney is or does, he cannot understand or appreciate his right to an 
attorney.     
 Interestingly, although scores of youths ages 13 through 16 in the 21st century 
sample did not differ significantly from those of youth in the 1970s, youth ages 17 
through 19 in the 21st century sample scored significantly lower than same aged youth in 
the 1970s.  The observed effect size was large, indicating that  today’s older youth 
exhibited poorer comprehension of the nature of interrogation, right to silence, and right 
to counsel. This finding is notable because the FRI used in the 21st century study was 
identical to that used in the 1970s.  Questions on this instrument tap the intelligent aspect 
of a Miranda waiver and assess appreciation of the key concepts of the role of police 
during interrogation, the continued right to silence in court, and the role of an attorney.  
FRI findings may indicate that youth today, at least of older ages, may have poorer 
abilities than their counterparts in the 1970s to make intelligent Miranda waiver 
decisions.  However, the potential differences between youth ages 17 through 19 
participating in the 1970s and 21st century studies prevent us from drawing definitive 
conclusions.    
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5.5 Examining Differences on Individual Items  
Although no significant difference was observed between the total CMR scores of 
the 1970s and 21st century participants, comparison of individual items revealed some 
differences.  Today’s youth seemed to have poorer comprehension of the right to silence 
and the right to an appointed attorney (the first and fourth prongs of the warning).  At the 
same time, youth today exhibited better understanding of the fact that statements would 
be used in court and the right to an attorney before and during questioning (the second 
and third prongs).  Thus, although overall comprehension on the CMR was comparable 
between the two samples, there appear to be differences in which aspects of the warnings 
youth today comprehended.  The finding that only 46% of the 21st century sample, as 
compared to 89% of the 1970s sample, adequately understood the right to silence is 
especially concerning, as understanding and appreciation of this right is fundamental to 
informed decision-making throughout interrogation and legal proceedings.  
The same pattern was seen across prongs on the CMR-R.  Youth today were better 
able to identify semantically identical sentences for the second and third prong of the 
warning, but made more errors than did their 1970s counterparts on the first and fourth 
prongs.  This consistency of performance on the specific prompts suggests that findings 
on the CMR reflect a true lack of comprehension and are not due to youths’ inabilities to 
verbally express the meaning of the warning. 
As suggested by the significant difference in total CMV scores between the two 
samples, fewer 21st century youth provided “adequate” definitions for each and every 
CMV item.  Today’s youth demonstrated consistently poorer abilities to define the key 
vocabulary used in Miranda warnings, with the most marked differences were seen on 
the words “consult” and “entitled.”   
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5.6 IQ, Age, Previous Experiences, and Miranda Comprehension 
 As expected, verbal IQ was consistently the strongest predictor of Miranda 
comprehension.  These results are consistent with both the 1970s study and other recent 
research since (e.g., Colwell et al., 2005).  The consistency in findings across time 
suggests that IQ may be the most reliable known predictor of Miranda comprehension.  
 The relationship between age and Miranda comprehension was not as clear with 
the 21st century sample as it appeared in Grisso’s research (1981).  The correlations 
observed between age and Miranda comprehension were substantially smaller than those 
found in the 1970s study, and the significant differences noted between age groups in the 
1970s were not observed in the 21st century study, even when less-conservative analyses 
were conducted.  Our results suggest that age may no longer be a clear and reliable 
predictor of Miranda comprehension.  These findings are contradictory to Grisso’s 1970s 
findings, as well as more recent research conducted using his instruments.  Viljoen and 
Roesch (2005) found that age was a significant predictor of Miranda comprehension in a 
sample of defendants ages 11 through 17.  In their study, youth were grouped into three 
age categories (11-13, 14-15, and 16-17), and equal numbers of youth in each category 
were recruited.  It is possible that varying numbers of youth in each age group of our 21st 
century study may have clouded real differences between the groups, although adequate 
power was observed for analyses comparing the age groups.  It is important to note that 
both Grisso’s (1981) study and the more recent Viljoen and Roesch (2005) study 
included participants ages 11 and 12.  Graphs of the 1970s results (see Figure 2 and 
Figure 4) on the CMR and CMV show major differences between 11, 12, and 13 year-old 
participants.  The relationship of age and Miranda comprehension may be different in the 
21st century sample because the Miranda comprehension of 11 and 12 year olds is not 
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included.  Youth of these ages were generally not housed in the MA or PA facilities from 
which participants were gathered.  Further research is needed to clarify the relationship 
between age and Miranda comprehension.  Nonetheless, this study suggests that it may 
no longer be possible to make simple inferences about Miranda comprehension based on 
a juvenile suspect’s age. Additionally, it seems that youth of all ages, in the 21st century 
sample, have poorer Miranda comprehension than did their counterparts in the 1970s.   
As such, courts may be overestimating the abilities of juvenile suspects. 
Ethnicity was not observed to moderate the relationship between previous 
experience with the police and Miranda comprehension in the 21st century sample.  
Regression analyses including five ethnic groups and analyses including only African-
American and Caucasian participants [to parallel Grisso’s (1981) analyses] both revealed 
no significant relationships between experience, ethnicity, and Miranda comprehension.  
It is important to note that the observed power for the interactions in both analyses were 
low, ranging from .15 to .5 for analyses involving all ethnic groups, and .07 to .18 for 
analyses including only African American and Caucasian participants.  Thus, it is 
possible that there are still differences in how experience with the police affects Miranda 
comprehension for youths of different ethnic groups.  Nonetheless, the relationship 
Grisso identified may have changed since the 1970s, as police departments have become 
more diverse and youth are more likely to be arrested and interrogated by officers with 
similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
5.7 Trends in Misunderstanding the Miranda Warning 
 As predicted, the errors made in youths’ understanding of the various Miranda 
prongs were similar in the 21st century and 1970s.  Generally, youth, at both time points, 
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seemed to have a literal, simplistic understanding of the warnings and often did not 
exhibit an understanding of the broad meaning or context of the right.  For example, most 
youth were familiar with the concept that bad behavior can result in punishment.  They, 
then, applied this understanding to the second prong of the Miranda warning, missing the 
larger implication that polite, true statements they give to police can also be used against 
them in adversarial court proceedings.    
Youth in both samples seemed to lack an understanding of key concepts 
fundamental to the Miranda warning.  Many youth did not appreciate the protected and 
inalienable nature of rights.  These misunderstandings could have critical implications for 
youth attempting to navigate the legal system.  Even among youth who were adequately 
able to define the right to silence, more than half thought a judge could force them to tell 
what had happened.  If this is the understanding with which youth are operating, they 
may not see any reason to remain silent during a long and stressful interrogation, if they 
are going to be forced to talk when they get to court.  Twenty percent of youth in the 21st 
century sample reported that if the judge learned that the youth had refused to talk to the 
police, the youth would be punished.   
These findings also highlight the importance of the distinction between 
“knowing” and “intelligent.”  A youth may be able to provide a factual explanation of 
aspects of the Miranda warning, without being able to apply the right in context.  As 
such, quick checks of Miranda comprehension, such as having the youth paraphrase each 
right, may actually overestimate youths’ comprehension.  Youth also seemed to 
consistently misunderstand the role of an attorney.   
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Youth in both samples also seemed to lack an understanding of the unique role of 
an attorney.  Many youth noted that the lawyer would want to know whether or not the 
youth had committed the crime, but most of these youth did not express an understanding 
that the lawyer was there to help.  Again, this misunderstanding has critical implications 
for why youth may or may not invoke their Miranda rights.  If a youth does not 
understand that a lawyer will be there to help and defend him, he is unlikely to ask for a 
lawyer during interrogation.  From the youth’s perspective, asking for a lawyer to be 
present simply increases the number of people questioning him.    
6 LIMITATIONS 
The current study is a comparison of the results of the 1970s study and the 21st 
century sample, in order to examine how juvenile offenders’ comprehension of the 
Miranda warning has changed over three decades, a time during which readings of the 
Miranda warning have proliferated throughout U.S. media to become part of the national 
culture.  Comparing two separate data sets gathered almost thirty years apart has inherent 
limitations.  There are differences in the participants and measures that cannot be 
avoided; however, examination of these differences suggests that they are not so limiting 
as to preclude comparison.  However, general limitations should be noted.  The 21st 
century sample is likely to over-represent urban youth, as the majority of youth were 
gathered from centers located in urban areas.  However, two of the three centers hold 
youth from both urban and rural surrounding areas.  Information regarding the youths’ 
home communities was not collected as part of the standard demographic form and, thus, 
remains unknown.  Miranda comprehension scores have not been noted to vary by 
location, but this variable has not been explicitly explored.  Results seem to be similar 
Miranda Warning Comprehension     99 
across samples gathered in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas (Grisso, 1981; 
Colwell et al, 2005).  
Complex analyses of 21st century data were also somewhat limited by a sample 
size relatively smaller than that used in the 1970s study.  Although this may have affected 
some analyses, adequate power was observed for the primary hypotheses comparing the 
two samples, and effect sizes were reported and evaluated in all analyses.    
Finally, there are two important limitations to interpreting the Miranda 
comprehension scores seen in both the 1970s and 21st century samples.  First, with both 
samples, the youths’ comprehension of the Miranda warning was evaluated in an 
environment carefully constructed to be calm and friendly.  This environment is very 
different than a typical police interrogation situation in which youth are under stress and 
generally not free to leave.  As such, results of both studies most likely represent an over 
estimate of youths’ abilities to comprehend the Miranda warning and must be interpreted 
as such.  Although this may appear to be a potential limitation of the instruments, both 
versions of the instruments were designed with this testing situation in mind and are 
intended to produce maximum understanding and appreciation scores. 
 In addition to interpreting Miranda comprehension scores as maximum 
comprehension, it is equally important to consider Miranda comprehension scores as 
only one of several elements considered when evaluating youths’ abilities to waive their 
rights.  The Miranda ruling established that a waiver of rights must be knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  Scores on instruments such as the 
Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (Grisso, 
1998) and the MRCI-II provide information about a youth’s knowledge of the warning 
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and understanding and appreciation of key aspects.  This knowledge is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for an intelligent decision to waive one’s rights.  In considering whether a 
youth’s decision is intelligent, the reasoning process employed by the youth must be 
considered.  The FRI provides some information on a youth’s understanding and ability 
to apply their Miranda rights in different relevant legal situations; however, it does not 
fully evaluate youths’ reasoning.  Although research has not found strong evidence of 
differences in youths’ and adults’ cognitive abilities (Cauffman & Steinberg 2000), 
research has shown that youth are significantly more likely than adults to make risky 
choices (Steinberg, 2005).  Decision-making differences may be due to youths’ 
psychosocial immaturity (Steinberg & Scott, 2003).  Psychosocial factors relevant to 
understanding differences in decision-making include, “susceptibility to peer influence, 
attitudes toward and perceptions of risk, future orientation, and the capacity for self-
management” (Steinberg & Scott, 2003, p.1012).  Psychosocial maturity (in this case 
defined as responsibility, perspective, and temperance) has been shown to be a significant 
predictor of decision making (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000).  For this reason, it is 
important to consider a youth’s cognitive abilities and psychosocial maturity in addition 
to Miranda comprehension.  Although the measures of Miranda comprehension included 
in this study do not provide information on all elements required for a waiver of rights, 
they provide important information on what parts of the warning a youth knows and 
understands.  This knowledge is an important foundation that will impact any decisions 
made by the youth, and, as such, is an important aspect to understand.     
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Continued Use of Grisso’s Instruments  
Results indicate that youth today do not seem to understand their Miranda rights 
any better than did youths in the 1970s.  Concerns have been raised by the courts (e.g., 
T.S.D. v. State, 1999) regarding the use and admissibility of Grisso’s original instruments 
because of potential improvements in Miranda comprehension.  Contrary to these 
expectations, results indicate that youth today may have poorer comprehension of some 
aspects of the warning than did youths in the 1970s.  As such, if performance of today’s 
youth is compared to Grisso’s norms, the average scoring youth would have scored in the 
lower percentiles of the 1970s.  Thus, using the relative standard of comprehension (i.e., 
comparing a juvenile suspect’s Miranda comprehension to that of other juvenile 
suspects) is problematic if the norms from the 1970s are used.  When published, the 
updated version of Grisso’s instruments, the MRCI-II, will provide much needed 
normative data on juvenile offenders in the 21st century.  Further studies on the Miranda 
comprehension of adult offenders and community samples of youth will be needed to 
place the understanding of 21st century juvenile offenders with in a broader context to 
assess relative understanding of rights.  Until such information is available, evaluating 
modern youth by such a relative standard is not advisable given the changes observed in 
some aspects of Miranda comprehension. 
Although relative comparison is questionable, results of the 21st century study 
indicate that Grisso’s original instruments continue to provide useful information about 
youths’ understanding of the Miranda warning.  Twenty-first century youth scored 
similarly on Grisso’s original instruments and the updated MRCI-II.  As such, the 
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instruments can continue to be used to evaluate youths’ Miranda comprehension until the 
MRCI-II is published with the updated measures and norms.   
7.2 Implications for the “Totality of Circumstances” 
Confirming results from the 1970s study, 21st century findings indicated that there 
continues to be no simple relationship between previous experience with the police and 
Miranda comprehension.  For this reason, we suggest that factors, such as previous 
number of arrests and detentions should not be considered within the “totality of 
circumstances.”  IQ, however, remained the strongest predictor of Miranda 
comprehension.  With the consistency of this finding across studies, we strongly 
recommend that youths’ IQ scores be given notable weight when evaluating Miranda 
comprehension.    In the 21st century study it was IQ, not age, which seemed to 
distinguish different groups of participants.  These findings contradict results from the 
1970s study, as well as other previous research, and require further exploration.  
Regardless, these results suggest that age may not be as strongly indicative of Miranda 
comprehension as previously assumed; as such, age, potentially, should play a more 
limited role in the “totality of circumstances” considered by judges when determining the 
validity of a Miranda waiver and admissibility of a confession. 
7.3 Legal Implications 
Given the proportion of youth who exhibit difficulty with the more easily 
measured aspect of “knowing,” a per se approach providing legal counsel to all youth in 
interrogations has been suggested (e.g., Grisso, 1980; Owen-Kostelnick, Reppucci & 
Meyer, 2006).  Other approaches have required a parental advocate, but do not seem to 
provide their intended protective function (Grisso, 1981; Grisso & Ring, 1979).  A 
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lawyer, however, could provide the youth with relevant legal knowledge and advice 
during an interrogation situation.  Recent research indicates that for pre-trial youth, time 
spent with their attorney is predictive of Miranda comprehension and legal capacities 
(Viljoen & Roesch, 2005).  This relationship was even stronger for youth with lower IQ 
scores (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005).  The counsel and presence of a lawyer during 
interrogation could protect the rights of youth and help compensate for their immature 
reasoning and deficient knowledge.   
 Such a per se approach may be rejected by policy makers and criticized by police, 
for whom the primary purpose of an interrogation is to solve crimes (Goldstein et al., 
2003).  Furthermore, there are serious financial implications to requiring lawyers’ time to 
participate in interrogations with youth.  Ultimately, the question remains for policy and 
legal decision makers about what levels of protection and understanding are required for 
and of youth.   As Owen-Kostelnick, Reppucci, and Meyer (2006) noted, the U.S. legal 
system’s treatment of juveniles depends on the youth’s role.  Although many civil 
policies recognize the immaturity of youths’ judgment and seek to protect youth from 
their own limited abilities, the same juvenile is viewed very differently after he or she has 
committed a crime.  A juvenile may be unable to drive a car, purchase cigarettes, or 
consent to medical procedures.  However, he is expected to make a knowing and 
intelligent decision about waiving his rights during interrogation.  This is a discrepant 
view of juveniles that may be related to public perceptions that youth are the perpetrators 
of serious crimes that must be deterred and punished for their actions (Owens-Kostelnik, 
Reppucci & Meyer, 2006).  Despite these public perceptions, current policies require due 
process protections for defendants and uphold the constitutional bases of these 
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protections.  A per se approach providing legal counsel to all youth would allow the 
intended protections of these policies to be in place for youth in interrogations.  The 
numbers of post-adjudication youth who exhibited inadequate understanding of their 
rights in the 21st century study suggest that the legal system may be overestimating 
youths’ abilities.  Our current system may, “create an unacceptable risk that a child who 
does not understand his or her Miranda rights or the relevant circumstances will be found 
to have made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver nonetheless” (King, 2006, 
p.477).    With what is now several decades of consistent research on the limited abilities 
of youth to make an informed and reasoned waiver decision, a per se approach requiring 
legal counsel for youth in interrogation situations may be indicated.  Such protection is 
particularly important for youths with lower IQ scores, as research has consistently 
shown a relationship between IQ and Miranda comprehension.  Although IQ can not be 
determined as easily as age or other factors considered within the “totality of 
circumstances,” it is possible that abbreviated measures of IQ could be utilized to quickly 
identify the youth most in need of protection and automatically provide such youth with a 
lawyer before and during interrogation.  
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